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ARTICLES
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE
STATE REMEDIES/BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
LYNN M. LoPucKI*

Traditional economic theory assumes that a business enterprise which uses credit and operates unprofitably will eventually

end in bankruptcy.' The assumption is correct only if "bankruptcy"
is understood in the broad economic sense of business failure, and
not as a reference to proceedings that take place in the bankruptcy

courts. A large percentage of the businesses which close and fall to
pay their creditors never file a bankruptcy proceeding.2 Liquidation
occurs through creditors' exercise of remedies provided under state
law or without legal proceedings.
In those cases that do make their way to the bankruptcy courts,
the remaining general creditors suffer a nearly total loss. In about

80 % of all straight bankruptcy cases there is no distribution to general creditors.3 In the remaining straight bankruptcy cases the average dividend paid is about 4.5 % of the allowed claims. 4 The average
dividend in reorganization cases is about 32 % of allowed claims, but

that figure includes both the amounts actually paid and the
amounts that debtors promised to pay after the reorganization case
was closed.8 The latter are often merely paper obligations which
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City; J.D. University of
Michigan, 1967; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1970.
1. See, e.g., Winter, Economic "NaturalSelection" and the Theory of the Firm, 4
YALE EcONOMIC ESSAYS 225 (1964).

2. Coogan, Broude, & Glatt, Comments on Some ReorganizationProvisions of the
PendingBankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149, 1154 n.8 (1975) (suggesting that more than
60% of financial distress cases do not involve court proceedings).
3. See ADMIN. OpFicE oF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES Op BANKRuPrcy STATISTICS, 8-9
(1978) [hereinafter cited as TASm oF BANKRuprcy STATISTICS]. Statistics are for cases
closed during the period July 1,1976 through June 30,1977. "Straight bankruptcy" is used to
refer to a proceeding under Chapters I through VII of the former Bankruptcy Act or Chapter
7 of the new Bankruptcy Code. These proceedings are for the purpose of liquidating the
debtor's assets, as opposed to reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11 or debt adjustment proceedings under Chapter 13 which contemplate that the debtor will retain his assets
while paying all or a portion of his debts.
4. See TABLES OF Brnuprcy STATISTICS, supra note 3, at A-16.
5. See id. at A-32.
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may again be discounted in a recurrence of the debtor's financial
difficulties.' On their face these statistics seem to suggest that the
processes of the bankruptcy court do not serve general creditors of
business debtors well.
It is one of the theses of this article, however, that the bankruptcy court's processes are healthy, and that the problem lies instead in the legal mechanisms that channel failing businesses into
the bankruptcy courts, the state courts, or informal liquidation processes. In all but a few cases, the meaningful stages of financial decay, recovery or liquidation occur outside the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court deals not with businesses in financial difficulty, but with their skeletons, already picked clean by workouts,
state court proceedings, informal liquidations, or merely the
ravages of time and poor management. "Bankruptcy," as that term
is used in economic theory, does not take place in the bankruptcy
courts.
Before turning to an analysis of why this is so and whether it is
desirable, it is first necessary to clarify the terminology that will be
used. The term "state remedies/bankruptcy system" will be used in
this article to refer to the system provided by law to compel the
payment of debt and to protect debtors from the collection efforts of
their creditors. The division between these two purposes is reflected
in the institutions which comprise the state remedies/bankruptcy
system. Generally speaking, it is the state courts acting under state
law such as that providing for attachment, garnishment, execution,
or discovery in aid of these proceedings, that enforce the creditor's
right to payment. The federal bankruptcy courts, on the other
hand, seem primarily to provide protection to debtors through proceedings that protect the debtor's property from seizure by the
state courts, extend the time for payment of debt, or discharge the
debtor from liability for his debts. These institutions are subsystems of the state remedies/bankruptcy system, and as such will be
referred to as the "state remedies subsystem" and the "bankruptcy
subsystem."
The state remedies and bankruptcy subsystems largely operate, at any given time, exclusively of one another. In the absence of a
bankruptcy proceeding filed by debtor or creditors, the case is governed by the procedures of the state remedies subsystem. Once a
bankruptcy petition has been filed, operation of the state remedies
6. See id. at A-32. The Administrative Office does not publish a statistic for amounts
actually paid in Chapter 11 proceedings.
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system ceases' and the bankruptcy subsystem assumes exclusive jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor, wherever located.8
Cases frequently originate in the state remedies subsystem and
later move to the bankruptcy subsystem; 9 in rare instances they
move in the opposite direction. 10 Cases may be dealt with exclusively by one or the other of the two subsystems. Some business
failures will not enter either subsystem. The business will be closed,
the assets liquidated, and the proceeds distributed to creditors or
owners without legal action. It is one of the main theses of this article that the critical stages of the process of business failure should
take place in the bankruptcy subsystem, under the supervision and
control of the bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy system alone has
been designed to deal with them. Yet these critical stages do not, in
most cases, occur within the bankruptcy subsystem. They have
been displaced into the state remedies subsystem or into an informal process, neither of which can protect the interests of the parties
or the society as a whole. As will be demonstrated in this article, the
displacement of the process of business failure from the bankruptcy
subsystem is largely the product of procedural dynamics which attract cases to, or repel them from, each of these subsystems.
Economists have developed various other theories which might
explain this displacement. Bulow and Shoven, for example, have
proposed a model in which such displacement may result from a
natural alliance between the debtor and a key lender which enables
the key lender to improve its position relative to other creditors by
financing continuation of the business, outside bankruptcy, even
though the business is insolvent and has a liquidation value that
exceeds its value as a going concern. 1 Nelson has proposed that the
displacement may be explained, at least in part, by the behavioral
characteristics of firms when they encounter severe financial difficulty.12 In particular, he focused on the disruption of the processes
that supply information about the firm's performance to creditors
7.

Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, participation in the bankruptcy proceeding

becomes the only permissible method of proceeding against the debtor for the purpose of
recovering a debt that arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. All judicial,
administrative or other proceedings against the debtor for that purpose are automatically
stayed by the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III 1979).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. III 1979).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 233-38.
10. A case which has not yet been fully administered in the bankruptcy subsystem may
be dismissed for cause, or if dismissal is "in the best interests of creditors and the estate," and
the case may thereafter proceed in the state remedies subsystem. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707, 1112,
1307, 362 (c) (2) (B) (Supp. III 1979).
11. Bulow & Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision,9 BELL J. EcON. 437 (1978).
12. P. NELSON, CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS (1981).
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and the firm itself, and also on the divergence of the interests of key
constituents of the firm from the interests of the firm itself.
These theories are necessarily incomplete. They proceed
within the confines of economic theory and give little consideration
to the very important influence of the procedural dynamics of the
state remedies/bankruptcy system. On the other hand, the legal
literature has focused narrowly on the role of certain legal procedures in the displacement process, 3 while failing to develop a general theory of the operation of the state remedies/bankruptcy system broad enough to account for both the economic and legal
aspects of the displacement problem. This article is an attempt to
develop such a theory.
Part I of this article examines the functions, both legal and economic, that are performed by the state remedies/bankruptcy system. It also examines how these functions are performed in each of
the two subsystems in cases that are dealt with entirely within the
subsystem in which they originate. Part II considers the relationship between the two subsystems, focusing on the procedural dynamics that attract cases to each. Part II reaches the conclusion
that the procedurally induced displacement of the process of business failure from the bankruptcy subsystem distorts that process in
a manner that is economically undesirable. Part III presents a proposal for a simple amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, the adoption of which would restore the process of business failure to the
bankruptcy subsystem. Part IV describes the procedural dynamics
of the current state remedies/bankruptcy system, and the manner
in which the proposed reform would affect those dynamics.
I. THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE STATE REMEDIES/
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM

Among the functions performed by the state remedies/bankruptcy system are: forcing the closing of nonviable enterprises;
avoiding waste, fraud, and unfair" distribution of assets by insol13.

See, e.g.,

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUrCY LAWS OF THE UNrrED

STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CommisSION REPORT].

14.

Although some authorities consider any distribution to general creditors which is

not pro rata in proportion to their claims to be unfair, see, eg., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1977), non pro rata distributions are not "unfair" as that term is employed in this
article without some additional element being present, such as an attempt by those in control
of the failing enterprise to benefit themselves personally. Such an "unfair" transfer may,
nevertheless, be nonfraudulent, for example, where the failing enterprise openly elects to give
security to owners for bona fide debts owing to them.
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vent debtors; coordinating creditors in the exercise of their remedies; and resolving disputes between debtor and creditor; as well as
the more commonly recognized functions of forcing the payment of
debts and restoring the overburdened debtor to productivity
through discharge or extension of debt. These functions each give
effect to one or more public policies.
These functions are, in many cases, performed through a complex interaction between the state remedies and bankruptcy subsystems. Cases move back and forth between the two subsystems,
thereby changing the applicable rules and procedures, which in turn
change the way in which the functions will be performed. In addition, the fact that another subsystem which may resolve the case
differently might be invoked by one or more of the parties will also
affect the way in which the parties interact while under the exclusive jurisdiction of the subsystem where the case is then pending.
For example, parties who attempt to settle a debt which is being
litigated in the state remedies subsystem should be, and often are,
aware that if a bankruptcy proceeding is filed by or against the
debtor within the preference period of section 547 (b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the payment may be recovered by the trustee or
debtor in possession. That awareness can affect the amount as well
as the terms of the settlement. These actual and anticipated movements of cases from one subsystem to another make it difficult to
determine or describe how various functions of the entire system
are performed.
To overcome that difficulty, the assumption will be made
throughout this part of the article that cases are resolved entirely
within one or the other of the subsystems, and cannot move back
and forth between them. After comparing the manner in which the
functions of the state remedies/bankruptcy system are performed
in each of the two subsystems, it will then be possible to abandon
this assumption in Parts II and III and examine the effects of the
movement of cases between subsystems on the performance of the
functions.
A. Coercing the Repayment of Debt
The state remedies/bankruptcy system exists to facilitate the
lending of money.' The underlying assumption is that if creditors
15. The National Bankruptcy Commission used the term "open credit economy" to
refer "to the role of private credit generally in the economy of the country." It argued persuasively that the primary external goal of the bankruptcy process was to support the "open
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have no means of coercing the repayment of loans, they will be unwilling to make them in the first place and the economy will suffer.

(Historically, the means to coerce repayment were devised first, and
debtor protections arose in response to them.) '6While the necessity

for providing coercive collection remedies has itself recently come
into question, 17 coercion of repayment remains a function that is
central to the system. Without it, performance of many of the remaining functions becomes unnecessary.1
In the state remedies subsystem, the coercion of payment is
usually a two-step process.'9 The first step is to afford the debtor due

process on the question of whether the debt is owing, and if so, in
what amount. The creditor files a lawsuit at the conclusion of which
judgment is entered, usually in favor of the creditor. The judgment

entitles the creditor, in the second step, to the benefit of various
procedures that apply property of the debtor to payment of the
debt. In the most common examples, a writ of execution may be
employed to have personal or real property sold, a writ of garnishment may be used to reach debts owing to the judgment debtor or
property in the hands of a third party, or a creditor's bill may be
used to reach the debtor's equitable or intangible interests in property.

In some instances the state remedies subsystem can efficiently
and effectively transfer value from debtor to creditor in satisfaction
of the debt. For example, after garnishment, the debt may be
promptly paid in cash by the third party debtor.2 1However, in their
credit economy" and that it did so in part by "improving the administration of creditors'
rights laws." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 68.
16. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 1-30 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979
WIs. L. Rsv. 1047, 1081-86.
18. For example the "bankrupt" needs a "discharge" to be "restored to productivity"
only because the possibility of coercive collection threatens his ability to work. The discharge
thus provides limits on the use of coercive collection remedies.
19. Where the creditor is eligible for a prejudgment writ of attachment both steps may
be accomplished at the same time, but such eligibility is relatively rare. The creditor generally must show some difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant, that the debtor is
secreting or fraudulently transferring its property, or that the creditor's claim is based on
fraud or is for "the necessities of life." See W. WARREN & W. HOGAN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
54-55 (2d ed. 1981). The great majority of jurisdictions restrict domestic or resident attachment to cases in which the debtor has been guilty of or is likely to engage in fraudulent conduct such as concealing or absenting himself or secreting or transferring the property with
intent to defraud his creditors.
20. See generally D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 46-67 (2d ed.
1980).
21. In this situation legal process is effective because the property seized is a cash
obligation that the third party debtor is able to pay. Had the garnishment instead been of
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routine operation, the state remedies are highly inefficient in transferring value from debtor to creditor and operate primarily in terrorem. Consider, for example, an execution against equipment used
in a manufacturing operation. In most jurisdictions the sheriff must,
in making the levy or execution, take physical possession of the
equipment.2 This will, of course, interrupt the operation of the business, idling not only the equipment itself, but also labor and other
assets used in the business. After some delay, ostensibly for the purpose of advertising the sale,2 the equipment will be auctioned 24 to
the highest bidder and the proceeds applied to the debt.2
The advertising is, however, done in a very perfunctory manner, usually in the legal notices column of a newspaper.2' The manner of advertising is calculated not to attract bidders but to satisfy
formal requirements. Property to be sold at execution sale need
only be "described with reasonable certainty, so as to enable prospective purchasers in the exercise of ordinary diligence, to identify
it." Thus, descriptions which fail to give the typical reader sufficient information to know whether he is interested in the property
are nevertheless legally sufficient.2' Many state remedy sale procedures do not require that the property even be made available for
viewing by prospective bidders,2 ' and bidders would certainlynot be

other property in the hands of the third party, or a debt due which the third party was presently unable to pay, the necessity for forced liquidation would arise.
22. See, e.g., In re Kerns' Est., 90 App. 1, 103 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio App. 1950); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 688 (C) (West 1982); Mo. R. Civ. PRoc. 76.06 (b), (c) (West 1982).
23. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 692 (West 1982) (10 days prior to sale of personal
property, 20 days prior to sale of real estate); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.21 (West 1969) (four
successive weeks of newspaper advertisement or posting of notice for 30 days prior to sale);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.18 (West 1947) (10 days posting prior to sale of personal property,
six weeks posting prior to sale of real property).
24. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 694 (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.20 (West
1947); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.15 (Page 1981).
25. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 691 (West 1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5234 (McKinney 1977).
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.21 (West 1969); Mo. REV. STAT. § 513.205 (1959);
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 5233 (McKinney 1977).
27. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 211 (1942).
28. See, e.g., Everts v. Will S. Fawcett Co., 74 P.2d 815, 817-18 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1937) (property to be sold was described as all causes of action against certain defendants in
a certain court); Bell v. Mock, 413 Pa. 71,72-73,197 A.2d 610,611 (1963) (real property to be
sold was described only by legal description and improvements on the property were not
mentioned).
29. A relatively progressive California law provides that personal property capable of
manual delivery must be "within view of those who attend the sale." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
694 (Deering 1931). This statute has been interpreted to ensure prospective bidders the right
to "inspect" the property to be sold. Faivret v. First Nat'l Bank, 160 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1947).
However, a single inspection on the date of sale is apparently the extent of the right.
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able to test the equipment to find out whether it works.' Purchasers
at the sale buy subject to preexisting liens31 and defects in title,u
even though they are not specified in the notice of sale3 and it may
be impossible for even the most careful purchaser to determine
what liens exist or what title he would obtain.3 The creditor is often
the only bidder at the sale, and he has little incentive to make a
reasonable bid. As the only bidder at a sale, the creditor can
purchase the property at a nominal price and then proceed against
other property for the balance of the debt.3 By purchasing property
at less than its market value at successive execution sales and reselling it for market value, the creditor, in effect, can collect more than
the entire amount of the debt. The possibility of such a windfall,
under procedures in most states, removes from the creditor any incentive to encourage bidding at the sale. Using a terse description of
m advertising the sale in the least effective of
the property to be sold,3
the legally acceptable places, and making only the minimum bid
required for validity of the sale, are ways in which the creditor can
maximize his possibility of obtaining such a windfall.37 Survival of
the rule of law that a sale may not be set aside merely for gross
inadequacy of price attests to the ineffectiveness of these proce30. Consider, for example, the problems presented when the sheriff conducts an execution sale of an automobile. Prospective purchasers would be unwise to bid on the assumption
that the automobile is operative and not in need of major repair, without at least test driving
the automobile. The sheriff, on the other hand, would be equally unwise to permit test drives
with the concomitant problems of possible theft, accidental destruction of the automobile,
injury to third parties for which the sheriff might have liability, and mechanical problems, in
addition to paying for gas, oil and other routine maintenance. The author is unaware of any
sheriff's office which permits the test drive.
31. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 291 (1942).
32. Id. at § 287 (a) (" [T] he doctrine of caveat emptor applies to execution sales, and,
subject to certain exceptions, the purchaser takes whatever title the execution debtor has, no
more and no less.").
33. Id. at § 201(d).
34. Consider, for example, the case in which the judgment debtor's predecessor in title
granted a security interest in the property. The financing statement perfecting that security
interest could be located only by knowing the name of the predecessor in title or his creditor,
yet the financing statement remains effective with regard to the collateral, U.C.C. § 9-402 (7)
(1978). Thus it would be necessary for the prospective purchaser of personal property at an
execution sale to search the U.C.C. filings in the name of all prior owners of the collateral to be
certain of the state of title. See U.C.C. § 9-402 (7) comment 7. There are no public records
which would disclose the names of prior owners of most kinds of personal property.
35. See 33 C.J.S. Executions § 16 (b) (1942) (the creditor "may successively sue out
and levy writs until he reaches that point at which the law declares the debt to be satisfied").
36. 30 AM. Jus. 2D Executions § 322 (1967) states that, "Notices and advertisements
of execution sales of realty are not necessarily rendered insufficient by their failure to mention or describe all the improvements thereon."
37. A few states have enacted legislation designed to minimize the extent of the windfall, e.g., OHio Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.20 (Page 1981).
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dures to encourage bidding-'
While a few creditors may benefit from the windfalls they receive as a result of this procedure, that benefit is more than offset by
the losses of the debtor, other creditors, and the economy as a
whole. The debtor is deprived of his property without satisfying an
equal amount of the debt. Other creditors may lose more than just
the opportunity to share in the windfall. They may also lose the
opportunity to collect from future earnings of the debtor's now defunct business. The sale procedure itself has created expenses, a
substantial portion of which are borne by the general public
through tax revenues. There are no corresponding benefits for these
losses, since the sale procedure has not accomplished its economic
goal of transferring the assets to a purchaser who has a need for
them and will use them more productively than the debtor. After
the execution sale it is not uncommon for the creditor who
purchased at the sale to immediately offer the property for resalethis time in the commercially reasonable manner to a purchaser
who will actually pay the market value. The threat of these procedures provides the knowledgeable debtor with a strong incentive to
liquidate property voluntarily, to pay the debt beforehand, and
thereby to avoid their invocation. However, this in terrorem effect
of the procedure has severe limitations. Many debtors do not understand the procedure and therefore fail to react. Others may act with
full understanding, but due to market conditions or the nature of
the property, have insufficient time to effect a private sale. For example, the debtor may be unable to liquidate poorly leveraged real
estate at a time when the government is pursuing tight money policies.s9 Since the state remedy proceedings are matters of public
record, potential buyers are often aware that the debtor is laboring
under a deadline. Such awareness would also tend to depress the
price or make the sale more difficult, since the potential purchaser
has the option of purchasing at public sale. The approaching public
sale may unduly constrict the time available for negotiation of the
sale or verification of the quality of, or the debtor's title to, the property; and the additional complexity of dealing with the hostile execution creditor, who may have his heart set on obtaining a windfall
himself by purchasing at sale, may discourage other potential purchasers. Such sale procedures, whether they operate directly or in
terrorem, are obviously ill suited to the task of liquidating the
38. See, e.g., Wiesel v. Ashcraft, 26 Ariz. App. 490, 549 P.2d 585 (1976); Milner v.
Denman, 21 11. 2d 182, 171 N.E.2d 654 (1961).
39. See generally E. ALTMAN, CoRPomR BAuNuurcy iN AMERCA 37-56 (1971).
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debtor's property for the benefit of creditors.
The bankruptcy subsystem, like the state remedies subsystem,
affords the debtor due process on the question of whether the debt
is owing, and if so, in what amount, but it does so by a very different
procedure. In bankruptcy, the debtor files schedules under oath listing his creditors and the amounts that the debtor asserts are owing.1 Each creditor is notified of the proceeding by ordinary mail,
and is required to file sworn proof of the existence and amount of his
claim.4 The bankruptcy procedure recognizes, unlike the state procedure, that the insolvent debtor may have no interest in defending
against a creditor's claim and that the real party in interest may be
other creditors whose share would be diminished by payment of the
claim. Under the bankruptcy procedure, a court appointed trustee
reviews the debtor's schedules and creditors! claims and objects to
any that are improper." In the event that the trustee objects to a
claim, the creditor is given notice and an opportunity for hearing."
Significantly, these procedures can go forward simultaneously with
the liquidation of the debtor's property."
As in the state remedies subsystem, coercion of payment in the
bankruptcy subsystem is accomplished by forced sale of the
debtor's property, but the sale procedures are vastly superior to
those employed in the state remedies subsystem. The bankruptcy
court appoints a trustee who is vested with the power and duty, subject to court approval, to sell the debtor's property and distribute
the proceeds to creditors." Property is appraised before it is offered
for sale,47 and an opportunity for hearing on the advisability of the
sale is afforded all parties." Although public auction is preferred,
the trustee may, for good cause shown, sell the property by
whatever method best suits the particular situation." Perishables
may be sold by private sale, a personal residence may be listed with
40.
41.
42.
ings "for

FaD. R. BAKR. P. 108.
Id. 203.
Id. 302. The filing of a proof of claim is, however, excused in Chapter 11 proceedany claim or interest that appears in the schedules." 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. III

1979).
43.

FED.R. BANKR. P. 306.

44.

Id.

45. 'The trustee is under no artificial deadline in the liquidation of the debtor's estate.
In the event that funds are available for distribution before all objections to claims have been
determined, the court can authorize a partial distribution to those creditors whose claims

have been allowed. Id. 308.
46. FED. R. BANKR. P. 605, 308.
47. Id. 606(a).
48.- Id. 606(b); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 725, 726 (Supp. III 1979).
49. FED.R. BANYM. P. 606 (b) (2).
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a real estate broker, stock or commodities may be sold on an established market, or the inventory of a business may be sold in the
ordinary course of that business. Although he is sometimes hampered in his efforts by lack of liquidity in the estate,' the trustee
may advertise the sale in the manner most likely to arouse purchasers, buyers can be afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the
property, and the trustee can contract to provide marketable title.6 1
While these liquidation procedures are unlikely to be as effective as voluntary sale by a private owner of the property, and while
the injection of a disinterested trustee into the process results in
additional expense, there is every reason to believe that bankruptcy
sale procedures produce substantially higher net returns to creditors than state sale procedures.6
B. Restoring the Overburdened Debtor to Productivity Through
Dischargeor Extension of Debt
The free market economic model assumes that the businessman is motivated by the profits generated by his labor or decision
making. Implicit in that motivation is the possibility that there will
be profits that can be distributed to the owners, i.e., proceeds of
operations that in the long run exceed the amounts necessary to
conduct operations and provide for creditors. When a debtor has
liabilities in excess of the value of his assets, that possibility diminishes and several adverse effects appear. First, the debtor is moti50. Except in cases where the debtor is in possession of cash at the time of filing the
petition, the trustee is faced with the problem of financing the various services, including
those of lawyers, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers or investigators, that he may need to
perform his duties properly. Until he has done some investigation, the trustee can seldom be
confident that there are unencumbered assets from which he can obtain the necessary funds.
Those who work with the trustee often take the risk that funds will be forthcoming. In some
instances the lack of funds makes it impossible for the trustee to perform his duties.

51.

See 13

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

606.08-.12 (14th ed. 1977).

52. In bankruptcy sales it is usual to receive more than 75% of the appraised value of
the property, and until adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, sale of property for less than
75% of the appraised value was prohibited except subject to subsequent approval of the
court. 11 U.S.C. § 110f (1976). In only a few instances have state legislatures attempted to
control the minimum prices at which property may be sold in execution sales. In such efforts a
requirement that the purchasers pay two-thirds of the appraised value has been considered
stringent. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.93 (West 1950) (prohibiting sale for less than twothirds of appraised value until the third successive day the property has been offered for
sale); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.15,2329.20 (Page 1981) (setting a minimum sale price of
two-thirds of the appraised value of real or personal property). Not uncommonly, judicial
sales which were valid under state law are set aside by the bankruptcy court so that the
property can be resold at a bankruptcy sale. See, e.g., In re Madrid, 10 B.R. 795 (B.C.D. Nev.
1981) (prebankruptcy judicial foreclosuure sale of real property for 64% to 67% of market
value set aside because "the [bankrupty] Courts have established a firm 70% guideline...").
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vated in the direction of high risk investment. Normal returns may
be insufficient to pay his creditors, leaving no possibility of personal
gain to the debtor from normal operations. The high risk investment, regardless of its intrinsic merits, may offer the only possibility
that the debts will be repaid and that there will be something remaining for the debtor. Second, at some point the insolvent debtor
is likely to have insufficient cash flow to keep current in his debt
repayment. Creditors will then initiate collection proceedings which
will impose additional legal expense on the debtor. Assets will be
forcibly liquidated through legal process for less than their market
values. The debtor will be left finally with only those assets, if any,
that are exempt,' and the amount by which liabilities exceed assets
probably will have widened considerably in the process. At this
point, the debtor will not only be without the ability to pay the
debts, he probably also will be angry with his creditors and disinclined to make any further efforts to pay. He will be motivated only
toward profits that need not be shared with his creditors.
While the existence of unsatisfied judgments against an individual debtor might have the effect of barring him from continuing
in his trade or business, it may instead merely cause him to move to
a location distant from his creditors s or structure a financial relationship with a friend or relative that allows him, on the fringes of
legality, to do business in the friend's or relative's name. As an example of the latter technique, the debtor may structure his affairs
such that he is an employee of the friend or relative, receiving only a
fully or partially exempt salary for his efforts. The assets of the business are owned by the friend or relative, who may, from time to
time (particularly when creditors are not in hot pursuit) voluntarily share them with the debtor by way of gift or bonuses. In either
instance the debtor's continuation in his trade or business is unduly
complex, costly, and risky. Even years later aggressive creditors
may locate the debtor or successfully challenge the debtor's relationship and plunge the debtor back into the downward spiral of
collection procedures. The economic productivity of a debtor in
these circumstances will probably be significantly diminished.
Restoration of debtors to productivity is highly visible in the
bankruptcy subsystem. Discharge of debtors from liability for their
debts is often, though incorrectly, thought to be the very essence of
53. The benefit of laws exempting assets from execution or other legal process is limited to individual debtors, hence they are of relatively minor importance in business bankruptcies. See generally 35 C.J.S. Exemptions §§ 11-25 (1960).
54. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 161.
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the bankruptcy process.6 Debtors are discharged by issuance of decrees to that effect," that automatically operate as injunctions
against further efforts to collect the debts.57 Should further collection efforts occur, the contempt power of the bankruptcy court can
be invoked.u Alternatively, restoration to productivity may be accomplished in the bankruptcy subsystem through the restructuring
of debt. This may be merely an extension of the time for payment,
for example, where the monthly payment on a mortgage is lowered
or the debtors are temporarily relieved of the necessity to make any
payments at all." It may also consist of partial discharge of debt
with the debtor remaining obligated to repay the remainder, or it
may be a combination of extension and partial discharge. Such restructuring may be accomplished under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code through agreement with certain requisite majorities of
creditors ®and court imposition of the agreement on dissenters, 61or
for certain debtors it may be accomplished under Chapter 13 by
court imposition of an agreement that is in the best interests of the
creditors.6 Whichever procedure is followed, the restructuring performs the necessary function if it leaves the debtor with obligations
that the debtor can meet and at least the same possibility of future
profitability that an entity newly entering the market would have.
State laws which discharge debtors from liability for their
debts are prohibited by the provision of the Constitution that
grants to Congress the power to "establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," together with
the enactment of federal bankruptcy legislation.6 Nevertheless the
state remedies Subsystem contains several mechanisms that function to restore the overburdened debtor to productivity. Laws exempting certain property, particularly the tools of the debtor's
trade" and earnings from personal services,5 from execution, gar55. See Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1940).
Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rules, Form No. 19, BANKRUPTcy RULES (A.
56.
Moller & L. King eds. 1981 Collier Pamphlet Edition, Part 2).
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2) (Supp. III 1979).
57.

58.

FED.

R.

BANKR.

P. 920.

See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. §§ 1126(c), 1129 (a) (8).
Id. § 1129(b).
Id. § 1325(a).
International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
64. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.4 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435
(Vernon 1949); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5205 (McKinney 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2329.66 (Page 1981). 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673.
65. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11 (West 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.030 (Vernon
1949).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
nishment, or other legal process, offer the debtor at least the physical ability to continue his productive efforts, although they fail in
most instances to provide the incentive for doing so because they
fail to exempt the fruits of the debtor's efforts. Earnings from personal services lose their character as such and cease to be exempt as
soon as they are deposited in a bank account," and neither an exemption for tools of the debtor's trade, nor one for his earnings can
be of much comfort to the debtor if the creditor can seize the proceeds of the debtor's labor as soon as the debtor receives them.
Where the debtor has been able to employ the corporate fiction
in his dealings with creditors, a change of corporate shell accomplishes virtually the same result as the bankruptcy discharge. The
corporation which continues to owe the debt is of course a mere fiction. The owner who employs the corporate form, like the discharged debtor, cannot be legally compelled to pay the debts of his
business. He is different from the discharged debtor in that he gives
notice at the outset of his intention to exercise the right to walk
away from those debts, and he usually does not suffer the stigma
that goes with a bankruptcy discharge.67
Where the statute of limitations is applied to bar action on undisputed debts, or laws regarding the dormancy of judgments fall to
provide for later revivor, the state remedies subsystem is performing the function of restoring the debtor's incentive to productivity
by irrevocably wiping the slate clean. Both statutes of limitations
and dormancy laws require that the debtor wait relatively long periods of time, in a state of uncertainty, to obtain their benefits; but for
the debtor whose financial difficulties are five or six years behind
him, they are often a viable alternative to bankruptcy.
Finally, the state remedies subsystem is notoriously lacking in
procedures for efficiently tracing or monitoring a debtor who has
once proven uncollectible and has moved to another jurisdiction.
The law might have provided that the contempt power of the court
could be used to compel the judgment debtor to furnish the court
with notice of change of address during the time that a judgment
remains unsatisfied. In bankruptcy proceedings the debtor often is
placed under an affirmative duty to keep a current address on
record with the court, even though the proceedings may extend for
66. Dunlop v. First Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 855 (Ariz. 1975).
67. Business failures in the corporate form may be just as relevant to future extension
of credit as failures in other forms. The entrepreneur who fails in the corporate form, however, does not owe the debts and therefore it is more difficult for the credit reporting community to transmit the information or for lenders to evaluate it.
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several years.' State remedy procedures, however, contemplate
that the judgment creditor will periodically locate the debtor and
serve him with notice that the proceedings are to be recommenced.6
Through these procedures the state remedies subsystem provides a functional substitute for the bankruptcy discharge and can
thereby restore the debtor to productivity. From the debtor's point
of view they are effective enough that many overburdened debtors
prefer to stay within the state remedies subsystem rather than to
seek a bankruptcy discharge that carries with it legal. expense,
stigma, investigation of the debtor's financial affairs, and the possibility of remedial action that creditors otherwise would fail to take.

C. Forcingthe Closing of the Nonviable Enterprise
Whether it is desirable for the state remedies subsystem to
force a business enterprise to cease operations depends upon
whether the business is obtaining a return from use of its assets
which is of more value than could be obtained from sale of the assets. In economic jargon this comparison is often expressed as operating value versus liquidation value.70 The formula recognizes that
the desirability of continued operation does not depend upon the
business being profitable or able to pay its debts as they become
due; nor does it depend in any degree upon the amount of debt the
business owes or the relationship between the amount of debt and
the value of assets. Under some circumstances, it may be desirable
to permit and encourage the continued operation of an insolvent,
unprofitable business.
To demonstrate this proposition, consider an enterprise, hopelessly overburdened with debt, whose operation is accurately represented by the following abbreviated income statement:
68.
69.

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 402 (6).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 56.29(3) (1981).

70. See, e.g., Ang & Chua, Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the LiquidationDecision, 11 BELL J. ECON. 355, 355 (1980); BULOW & SHOVEN, supra note 11, at 438 ("ongoing
value" versus "liquidation value").
71. It is assumed for the purpose of this example that the firm is unable to obtain credit
for any operating expenses and that they must therefore be paid as they accrue.
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Revenues
Expenses
Depreciation
Interest Accrual
All other expenses 1
Operating Loss

100
30
250
90
370
270

Assume that this operation represents the best that the business
can do, and that if the business is permitted to continue to operate
it will continue to incur these same losses. Since it cannot pay even
the interest on its debt, the debt will continue to increase in total
amount. The debt will never be paid in full and the owners of the
equity interest in this enterprise will never receive any return on
that interest.
Nevertheless, it may be desirable that this business continue to
operate. Assume, for example, that the assets of the business are
highly specialized, and have no resale value.72 If the business ceases
operations on X date, from that date forward there will be no revenues, either from sale of assets or operations, and therefore there
can be no payments to equity owners or creditors. If, on the other
hand, the business continues to operate until the assets have worn
out, it must pay expenses of ninety each period, and will have revenues of 100. It is not necessary to make any payment for the depreciation expense, ' 3 and therefore there will be ten available each period for payments to creditors and nothing available for equity
owners. In this illustration it makes no difference to equity owners
whether the business operates or not, but continued operation will
mitigate an otherwise total loss for creditors. Continued operation
is desirable from an economic point of view.
By experimenting with this illustration, it can be determined
that variation in either the amount of depreciation or the amount of
72. The extreme case of assets with no resale value is used to simplify the example. If a
positive resale value is assumed, it must be compared with the present value of the expected
excess of revenues over "all other expenses" for all future periods, to determine whether the
firm should continue to operate or liquidate.
73. Depreciation is merely an accounting device for apportioning the cost of an asset
over its expected useful life. No periodic payment is actually made. In this analysis, the cost
of the assets is irrelevant, because it is incurred whether the business liquidates or continues
to operate. The relevant comparison is between the amount which can be obtained for the
asset through liquidation and the amount which can be obtained as net revenues from its

continued use.
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debt will not negate the desirability of continued operation of the
business. However, a drop in revenues or an increase in "all other
expenses" (these are expenses, including any repair or replacement
of assets, for which the enterprise must actually pay) can negate
that desirability. A generally applicable formula can be stated: Continued operation will be economically desirable so long as the
present value of the future excess of revenues over expenses other
than interest on debt already incurred and depreciationon assets
alreadyowned exceeds the resale value of the assets. The business
enterprise which meets this test will be referred to in this article, in
accordance with terminology in use in some bankruptcy courts, as
"viable."
Economic theory as to how resources are allocated in a free
market economy suggests the desirability of assuring that the nonviable enterprise will cease operating.7 ' At the same time economists
recognize that, even aside from the procedural shortcomings of the
state remedies/bankruptcy system, there are economic incentives75
and behavioral characteristics 6 of firms which give them a strong
tendency to continue despite their lack of viability. As one writer
put it, "The demand for organizations includes not only a demand
for their birth, but also a demand, which unfortunately seems to be
less effective, for their death."7 Whether or not legal procedures can
be devised that will give effect to the demand for the death of nonviable enterprises, there seems to be a consensus that giving effect
to the demand is critical to the free market economy. 8
In theory, the procedural mechanism by which cessation of operation would come about is simple. The losses from continued operation of the nonviable enterprise would be borne by the owners of
the enterprise, who would cease operation to avoid them.79 In fact,
though, most businesses operate using substantial amounts of
credit. If those businesses fail, the owners may be under no obliga74.
75.

76.
77.

See Ang & Chua, supra note 70, at 355.
See, e.g., Bulow & Shoven, supra note 11.
See, P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 94-104.

Boulding, Intersects: The Peculiar Organizations, THE CONFERENCE BOARD
RECORD, Mar. 1973, at 54, 56.
78.
See, e.g., id. at 56 (" [0] ne could argue that it was precisely the institution of
bankruptcy which gave such vitality and expansive power to capitalism."); P. DRUCKER,
MANAGEMENT 363 (1974) (" [T] here is a need also for an open ended economy, an economy in
which businesses can be born, but one in which businesses can also die. It is a basic weakness
of a state-owned or state-controlled economic system that businesses are not allowed to go
bankrupt and can only rarely be liquidated.").
79.

A. DEWING,

FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATION

1265-66 (4th ed. 1941).
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tion to repay the debt,10 or it may not be within their ability or in
their best interests to do so.81
The existence of debt which will not be repaid in the event of
liquidationu may have a substantial impact on the owner's decision
to continue or cease operations. For example, where the future prospects of a business are for either moderate profits or large losses,
and each is equally likely, the owner of a business which operated
entirely on contributed capital would elect to cease operations. Expected losses would exceed expected profits, and the potential
losses would be taken from the contributed capital as operating expenses exceeded revenues. If, instead, the business already had liabilities in excess of its assets, the potential losses would be borne by
creditors. Cessation of operations would fix the owners' losses and
eliminate any possibility of gain, whereas continuation of operation
would offer a moderate possibility of gain and no possibility of further loss to the owners. While the debtor may nevertheless be overcome with pangs of conscience, his financial incentive is to continue
to operate a business that is likely to be unprofitable.
If the insolvent, nonviable enterprise is permitted to continue
operations, it probably will consume values that would otherwise
have been available to creditors on liquidation. The source of this
dysfunction is apparent: an insolvent business operates not at the
risk of the owner, but at the risk of its creditors.8 It follows that at
some point the state remedies/bankruptcy system should provide a
mechanism for creditors to participate in, if not entirely control, the
decision to continue or cease operations. In fact both the state remedies subsystem and the bankruptcy subsystem provide such
mechanisms.
In the state remedies subsystem the function of closing the
nonviable enterprise is performed only as a byproduct of the coercion of collection. The fact that a business is insolvent and non80. This would be true in cases where the corporate fiction has been employed by the
owners in dealing with creditors and the creditors have not obtained personal guarantees
from the owners.
81. The owners may determine that a bankruptcy discharge or a rehabilitation through
the expiration of state remedies would better serve their interests. See supra text following

note 67.
82. If the debtor is incorporated such debt will usually be owing to trade creditors.
Institutional lenders such as banks will require collateral, personal guarantees from the owners, or both. The latter type of debt may be repaid in the event of liquidation, but not always.
The collateral may turn out to have been insufficient or the owners may have shared in the
corporation's financial difficulties and themselves become judgment proof.
83. 3 HALSBURy's LAWS Op ENGLAND 855 (4th ed. 1973). English law recognizes this
simple truth and therefore prohibits the debtor from continuing to trade after knowing himself to be insolvent. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26 (3) (c).
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viable is not grounds for forced closing or the removal of the debtor
from control.' Instead the dissatisfied creditor is required to reduce
his claim to judgment and then execute on assets of the debtor.
Levy of the execution does more than obtain a priority for the levying creditor over other unsecured creditors and initiating the process for sale. If the creditor levies on property essential to the operation of the business, the creditor's action will close the business.
This state remedies process makes only the crudest determination of the viability of the business enterprise. The court itself
makes no determination of the condition of the business; it determines whether the debt is due, and if so, in what amount, and then
enters the final judgment. The subsequent proceedings which may
actually close the business, such as levy under a writ of execution,
generally are considered ministerial and delegated to the clerk of
the court."
The creditor may have some incentive to make the viability determination on his own, since closing a viable business ensures that
its future income will not be available if necessary to satisfy his
debt. Only in rare instances, however, is the creditor in a position
where he can and should concern himself with the matter of
viability.
The determination of viability is costly and at best highly subjective. In attempting to compare going-concern value with liquidation value, the creditor will have difficulty with both sides of the
equation. The creditor must guess at the value of assets he has no
right to inspect, sold under procedures not designed to obtain the
best price. Predictions as to the future earning capacity of the business, uncertain in any circumstances, are particularly uncertain
here. Usually little information is available to work from other than
the debtor's chaotic accounting and his unwaveringly rosy future
outlook.
Where the debt is relatively small it is impractical for a single
84. In the absence of a statute, insolvency alone is not sufficient grounds for the appointment of a receiver. Lone Star Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. State, 91 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1936). Statutes commonly impose more severe requirements than mere insolvency or
lack of viability. The Delaware statute provides, for example, that the court may appoint a
receiver for an insolvent corporation, but only if the corporation is deadlocked or has "abandoned its business and failed within a reasonable time to dissolve, liquidate or distribute its
assets." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (a) (1974). The Florida statute provides that the circuit
courts may liquidate the assets and business of a corporation in an action by a creditor, but
only after the creditor has reduced his claim to judgment and execution has been returned
unsatisfied. FLA. STAT. § 607.274 (1) (b) (1) (1981).
85. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 682 (West 1982); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.160; N.Y. Civ.
PRtc. LAW § 5230(b) (McKinney 1977).
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creditor to attempt to make the determination. Moreover, in the
state remedies subsystem the creditor does not become entitled to
the information needed to make the determination until the judgment is entered or the writ of execution issued.8 By an immediate
levy at that time the creditor assures himself of the highest possible
priority in the debtor's assets. Why should he instead commence a
complex inquiry into viability? In the state remedies subsystem, the
creditor's race for priority ends only if he has levied upon assets
sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If he delays execution for the purpose of determining viability through discovery he may lose his
chance to obtain the highest priority still available. His entire collection effort can be nullified without warning by another creditor's
levy or by a preferential transfer to another creditor. Nor can the
creditor levy and then make the determination of viability at his
leisure. He must continue through with the forced sale promptly or
he will be divested of his priority. 7
Perhaps most importantly, the creditor who discovers that his
debt can be satisfied by execution has no incentive to concern himself with the question of viability. Immediate execution ensures
payment in full, and indeed may even offer the creditor the opportunity to obtain a windfall by purchasing the debtor's assets at
forced sale for less than their resale value. For example, if a creditor
holding a $5000 judgment purchases property having a market
value of $2000 at a sheriff's sale for a price of $1000, the judgment is
reduced by only the amount bid, $1000.8 If the creditor sells his
property for $2000 and enforces the remaining $4000 of the judgment against other property, the creditor collects, in effect, $6000
on a $5000 judgment.
While courses of action other than immediate execution risk
the possibility that other creditors will intervene, they offer insignificant advantages to the judgment creditor. It might seem that the
judgment creditor of a viable but severely distressed business could
use his powerful bargaining position to realize a profit in some manner less destructive than immediate execution. For example, he
might forbear from execution in exchange for the debtor's promise
to pay more than the full amount of the debt at a later time. However, the amount of such a premium paid for forbearance from exe86. See cases cited infra note 126.
87. See, e.g., Excelsior Needle Co. v. Globe Cycle Works, 48 A.D. 304, 309, 62 N.Y.S.
538, 540 (1900) ("The law is quite clear that the object of the execution is to enforce... the
judgment .... and not to convert ... it into a security upon the property, and still allow the
judgment debtor to prosecute his business regardless of the lien of execution.").
88. 33 C.J.S. Executions §§ 331-45 (1942).
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cution is considered to be additional interest, and hence is limited
by usury laws to a relatively modest amount.8 Only in very rare instances could it be large enough to induce a judgment creditor to
forbear execution and thereby risk the loss of the principal amount
of the debt to an intervening creditor.
It follows that, in most instances, there will be no actual determination of viability by the moving creditor. Having invested in collection by filing suit, the creditor will tend to continue through execution provided that there are unencumbered assets to levy upon or
a going business which he can threaten to close.
Because of these dynamics, the state remedies subsystem will
tend to close or fail to close businesses without regard to their viability.9 For example, the state remedies subsystem might close a
highly profitable business that, while expanding its operations, encounters cash flow problems. Such a business may be unable to borrow necessary cash, perhaps because of a tight money market, and
default on the installment debt which is then accelerated. The installment creditor would tend to obtain judgment and immediately
levy on assets essential to operation of the business. The business
might close even though it is viable. On the other hand, the state
remedies subsystem would fail to close an insolvent, nonviable enterprise which could hold a major unsecured creditor at bay, for a
period of months or even years, by litigating over the amount of the
debt which is owing in circumstances where the grounds for prejudgment attachment may not exist.9 1
In the bankruptcy subsystem, viability of the business enterprise can be, and often is, considered expressly in determining
whether the enterprise should be closed. Upon the filing of a Chapter 7 proceeding in the bankruptcy court, the court appoints an interim trustee who may be given authority to operate the business "if
such operation is in the best interests of the estate. 9 2 In Chapter 11
the court must appoint a trustee "if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests
of the estate .... " The trustee so appointed is required to "investi89. See 91 C.J.S. Usury § 23 (1955).
90. The system is actually operating irrespective of the viability of the business which
does not become an issue at any stage of the proceedings.
91. Grounds for prejudgment attachment are listed in supra note 19.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (Supp. III 1979).
93. Id. § 1104(a) (2). When read literally, the wording of this section would appear to
mandate the appointment of a trustee in most Chapter 11 cases. However, it was not the
intention of Congress that trustees be appointed routinely or even frequently. See H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 14, at 232-34. In the large majority of cases, no trustee is appointed. See
L. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
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gate the.., desirability of the continuance of such business..."9
and may continue to operate the debtor's business.95 If the trustee
elects to continue operation of the business, and the court approves
of his election, that operation is then shielded from any acts or remedies of creditors that might interfere with it.6
Even in the bankruptcy system not every viable business can
continue to operate. The system shields the enterprise from its
creditors; but the enterprise may be without the cash needed to acquire other resources, such as labor or materials, currently necessary to continued operation. To remedy this problem trustees are
given the power to borrow needed cash,97 and lenders who respond
to the trustee may, in some circumstances, be given priority over
existing claimants in distribution of the proceeds of the estate."
Where outside lenders choose not to become involved in the bankruptcy case, the trustee may attempt to borrow new money from
existing creditors who thereby hope to preserve the collectibility of
their earlier loans. In cases where there is a single large creditor who
will be entitled to all of the dividends awarded to general creditors,
a sufficient incentive might exist for the creditor to finance the
trustee. In the typical case, however, the trustee is seeking credit to
continue operations or recover assets that will produce a dividend
that is to be divided among numerous general creditors. A creditor
who is owed only a portion of the debt would not wish to act alone in
financing the trustee, since the benefits of that financing would inure to all creditors and thereby be diluted. The trustee has no authority to compel any creditor to participate in the necessary financing, or to exclude any from the benefits of such financing if it
can be obtained elsewhere. In cases where creditors are numerous
and each has a small portion of the total debt, further advances
from existing creditors will be difficult or impossible to arrange. In
other cases, existing creditors simply may be reluctant to "throw
good money after bad." In such cases even a viable business may be
forced to close. Aside from this practical problem of obtaining necessary operating funds, the bankruptcy system can perform the
function of closing the nonviable business and keeping the viable
ruptcyCode? (1982) (unpublished empirical survey of Chapter 11 cases filed in the Western
District of Missouri during the first year after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code).
However, this provision permitting appointment of a trustee remains available for use in
appropriate cases.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (a) (3) (Supp. III 1979).
95. Id. § 1108.
96. Id. § 362 (a).
97. Id. § 364.
98. Id.
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business in operation, to the extent that the trustee can distinguish
between the two.
D. Avoiding Waste, Fraud, and Unfair Distributionof Assets
The owners of a viable, solvent business enterprise have no reason to dissipate deliberately the assets of the business. They would
be stealing from themselves. In the nonviable, insolvent enterprise,
owners who are still in control of the business may realize that creditors will eventually receive whatever remains in the business, and
that the only way they, as individuals, can profit is by actions that
will or may remove the assets from the pool available to general
creditors.
The field of "bankruptcy planning," 9 which in the experience
of this author constitutes the major part of the practice of bankruptcy law on behalf of debtors, seeks, as its primary goal, to remove
as many of the assets as possible from the pool available to pay general creditors, and legally to apply them to the benefit of the owners. 1 Some examples will assist in defining this somewhat dubious
branch of practice.
Creditors, whether in the bankruptcy or state remedies subsystem, have access only to the debtor's nonexempt assets.101 At any
time prior to bankruptcy, nonexempt assets may be exchanged for,
or converted to, exempt assets so long as the conversion is not made
99. The term "bankruptcy planning" has been used for several years to describe the
somewhat dubious process discussed here. It apparently entered the literature in 1978 when
Professor Lawrence King of the New York University commented during the video seminar
entitled How to Practice Under the New Bankruptcy Code, jointly produced by Matthew
Bender and the New York University School of Law, "This is going to open up a whole new
area of practice. It's going to be called 'bankruptcy planning.' "
Professor Frank Kennedy of the University of Michigan replied, "We've had that.
That's nothing new."
Professor Vern Countryman of the Harvard Law School agreed, adding, "Every
debtor's counsel in California, unless he's incompetent and ought to be sued for malpractice
gets those building and loan association stocks before he puts him into bankruptcy."
100. In cases where the debtor is a corporation, and the persons to benefit from the
planning are principals, such planning creates formidable, though perhaps not unresolvable,
problems of professional responsibility for the attorney. To avoid even the appearance of
impropriety, the attorney should not represent both the corporation and the principals. The
attorney should be particularly wary of advising the principals that they should not attempt,
for example, to apply the assets of the corporation to bona fide debts owing to the principals
in preference to other creditors, since such an application may be valid, and not in violation of
the principal's fiduciary duties. See cases cited infra note 106. That advice may not fulfill the
attorney's duty to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means

permitted by law.
101.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. III 1979).

DR 7-101 (A) (1) (1979).
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with the actual intent to defraud creditors. 102 Thus it has been held
that the debtor, on the advice of the bankruptcy attorney, may use
nonexempt money to purchase exempt shares in a building and loan
association on the eve of bankruptcy, so long as he does so with the
proper state of mind. 103 Although the assets continue to be owned by
the debtor, they cease to be within the pool available to general
creditors. Since exemptions are not available to corporations, this
planning device is limited to use with unincorporated businesses.
An economically more significant device used by bankruptcy
planners is the paying or securing of debt to or for the benefit of the
owners. The failing business enterprise often owes debts to its owners. Such debts may be created as part of the incorporation and initial capitalization if the attorney is sensitive to the possibility of
later financial problems. Creation of such debt is often recommended by accountants to reduce income taxes.1'0 Finally, such debt
may result from the financial difficulties themselves, as where the
owners do not receive their salaries, but instead allow them to accrue.15 The payment or securing of such debt in the nonviable, insolvent enterprise removes the assets from the pool available to
other creditors, and applies them to the benefit of the owners; 6thus
circumventing the rule of law that an insolvent corporation may not
make distributions to its shareholders.107
102. H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 361 (1977) states:
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempted property into
exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition .... The practice is not fraudulent as
to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is
entitled under the law.
103. In re Wudrick, 305 F. Supp. 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
104. See Plumb, FederalIncome Tax Significance of CorporateDebt: A CriticalAnalysis and a Proposal,26 TAX. L. REv. 369 (1971).
105. Owners often continue to provide services for closely held corporations when the
corporation is unable to make immediate payment. The creditor's status as an owner, officer
or director of the corporation does not itself render the creditor's claim against the corporation invalid, but it may be avoided by the trustee where it is part of a fraudulent scheme to
defeat other creditors, or subordinated to the claims of other creditors where such subordination is determined to be "equitable." See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Herzog &
Zweibel, The Equitable Subordinationof Claimsin Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 83 (1961);
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$ 64.204 (2) (14th ed. 1975).

106. Such "preferential" transfers are valid under the laws of most states. See, e.g.,
Advance Dry Wall Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 80., 173 N.W.2d 827 (1969);
Land Red-E-Mixed Concrete Co. v. Cash Whitman, Inc., 425 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1968); but see
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1951). However, they can be set aside in bankruptcy
proceedings filed within a limited time thereafter. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b) (Supp. III 1979).
107. FLA. STAT. § 607.137 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41 (Smith-Hurd 1954);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1963). Many states also make directors personally
liable for such distributions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.144 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.42 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719 (a) (1) (McKinney 1963).
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This bankruptcy planning technique may take several forms.
The most straightforward is that the corporation may pay a debt
directly to owners. However, in most cases there is insufficient cash
to do so and still continue operations. The more common form is a
mortgage to owners on key assets of the business. This form puts no
cash pressure on the business, and will nevertheless ensure that the
owners will eventually be paid.
Another form of the technique is to cause the corporation to
pay a debt that the owners would otherwise be required to pay. In
addition to the situation where the owner has guaranteed a debt of
the corporation, this category would include situations where the
owners may have personal liability for a debt of the corporation as a
matter of law. The latter would include, to give two examples, the
liability placed on certain owners or officers of the corporation for
failure to remit withheld taxes to the Internal Revenue Service 118 or
officers' liability to persons who purchased illegally issued securities.109
A third form of the technique is for the corporation to pay a
debt that the owners would not be required to pay, but that will
indirectly benefit the owners. This may include debts to friends, relatives, or banks from which the owners expect to receive credit personally in the future. 10
Finally, the owners may continue operations to assure themselves continued employment or to indirectly benefit an affiliated
enterprise owned by them. An example of the latter would be continued operation of a nonviable, separately incorporated retail outlet to assure a market for the products of a viable manufacturing
firm owned by the same persons. Real benefits may accrue to the
manufacturing firm even though the products are sold at a fair
price.
A less direct technique of bankruptcy planning is excessive risk
taking by the financially distressed business. As has been discussed
in Part I (C) of this article, in the insolvent enterprise the risk of
loss is borne by the creditors, while the possibility of future profits
108. Westenberg v. U.S., 285 F. Supp. 915 (D. Ariz. 1968) (This section, imposing
penalty equal to the amount of taxes involved is not a true penalty, but a shift of liability for
the tax to corporate principals.); 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (Supp. III 1979) (100% "penalty" on
officers or other persons who withhold or collect taxes and fail to pay them over to the
government).
109. Securities Act of 1933 as Amended, tit. 1, § 15, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77.
110. Since these transactions involve no pecuniary benefit to the corporate principals,
they do not run afoul of even the most stringent state laws. See, e.g., N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §
15 (McKinney 1951). They can be avoided in bankruptcy proceedings initiated within the
applicable preference period. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b).
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remains with the owners. By risking loss and creating a concomitant
possibility of gain, the owners of the enterprise can indirectly transfer values to themselves. To use a very simple illustration, assume a
nonviable business which has $1000 in assets and $1000 in liabilities. If the business ceases operations, the owners' equity interest is
of no value. If instead the owners can arrange a legal bet of $1000 on
the flip of a coin, their interest should immediately have a value of
$500 since there is now a 50% chance that the assets will soon exceed liabilities by $1000. While in this simple form the taking of the
above risk might be legally objectionable, the basic principle behind
it operates to some degree in every business enterprise, whether solvent or not. In a condition of financial distress, the principle causes
a shift of value from creditors to equity holders which is reflected in
the phenomenon of corporations whose common shares have value
even though the corporations are clearly insolvent and their debt
securities have been discounted accordingly."' The decisions of
owners can create risk for existing creditors without offering creditors any additional return. The bankruptcy planner's function, described most cynically, is simply to determine how nakedly the
principle can be permitted to operate without offending decision
makers in the state remedies/bankruptcy system.
In the preceeding examples of the technique of bankruptcy
planning, it was assumed that those who owned and controlled the
business were also creditors. This is not typically true of larger enterprises, where those in control may be neither owners nor creditors. Bankruptcy planning occurs in those enterprises as well, but in
a more complex form. To illustrate this proposition it will be helpful
to draw upon the work of economists.
The equity holders of an insolvent large enterprise will want
the enterprise to avoid bankruptcy if at all possible,1 2 since in bankruptcy they may lose their interest in the firm. Those in control of
the enterprise, even though they may not be owners, will also want
to avoid bankruptcy because it may cost them their jobs or adversely affect their careers."
To avoid bankruptcy the failing enterprise often needs an infusion of new working capital. Bulow and Shoven have demonstrated
that the optimal source for these funds is usually a major creditor of
the enterprise."4 A major creditor may be interested in making such
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Gordon, Towards a Theory of FinancialDistress, 26 J. FIN. 346 (1971).
Bulow & Shoven, supra note 11, at 439.
See P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 98.
Bulow & Shoven, supra note 11, at 439.
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a loan because it will negotiate for an improved position on the already existing loan in return. As Bulow and Shoven put it:
In a financial crisis the equity holders always seek to convince the (major lender) to keep the firm in business by offering enough of the equity
position to make the (major lender's) claim with continuance (of the
business) more valuable than with bankruptcy. We shall assume that if
the equity holders can satisfy the (major lender) this way without foregoing their entire 1position,
then a deal will be arranged and the firm will
5
stay in business.'

Most important, Bulow and Shoven demonstrate that it may be in
the interests of both the equity holders and the major lender to
form this coalition and keep the enterprise operating, even though
the business has a negative net worth and its value in liquidation
exceeds its value as a going concern."6
This occurs in the Bulow and Shoven model because continued
operation imposes additional risks of loss on the creditors, while the
possibility of gain is shared between the creditors and the equity
holders. The major lender does not suffer the fate of the remaining
creditors because, as a condition of extending the new credit, it has
obtained a sufficient portion of the equity holder's possibility of
gain to more than offset the new loan. Operations continue at the
sole expense of the remaining general creditors.
The Bulow and Shoven model is essentially an example of
bankruptcy planning through risk taking by the equity holders. The
essence of the technique is not changed by the fact that the benefits
must be shared with the major lender. The sharing is voluntary, and
comes about because it is to the equity holders' advantage. Once it
is recognized that benefits of bankruptcy planning which nominally
accrue to a major lender may in fact be indirectly accruing in large
part to the equity holders and management (by providing them the
opportunity to continue operation of the business), use of the other
major bankruptcy planning technique, the securing of loans for the
benefit of owners, can be discerned in many large business
bankruptcies.
For example, approximately a year before W.T. Grant filed its
bankruptcy proceedings, the company owed nearly five hundred
million dollars in unsecured debt to various banks. The banks lent
W.T. Grant an additional one hundred million dollars, and in return W.T. Grant secured the entire six hundred million dollar debt
with previously unencumbered assets of the corporation. The com115.
116.

Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 445.
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pany lasted slightly more than a year before filing.I"
To explain this loan transaction it is not necessary to assume
that either the banks or the management of W.T. Grant expected
the company to survive. One can just as easily hypothesize that the
banks were willing to lend W.T. Grant the minimum amount necessary to persuade W.T. Grant to give them security and to ensure
that W.T. Grant would not have to file a bankruptcy proceeding
until the time in which a bankruptcy trustee could avoid the transfer had expired.1 8 Similarly, if the management of W.T. Grant be-.
lieved that the one hundred million dollar loan was probably insufficient to avoid bankruptcy, that would not have been reason to
refuse it. Refusal would have meant immediate, certain bankruptcy.
Acceptance of the loan would at least have offered some hope of
survival, and would cost management and equity holders nothing in
comparison with the alternative. The effect of the loan transaction
was to benefit W.T. Grant and the banks, at the expense of the general creditors.
In addition to providing protections for creditors against the
deliberate risk or removal of assets through bankruptcy planning
the state remedies/bankruptcy system must also protect them
against waste; undoubtedly the most common form of waste in the
insolvent enterprise is honest but poor management. 19 The management of a firm which encounters severe adversity tends to concentrate on avoiding bankruptcy "with such tenacity that it [is]
doubtful that profit maximization remain [s] a goal." 120 The frequency of appropriate managerial responses to the adversity drops
off. 1 Continued nonviable operation consumes asset values, either
reducing the assets available for later distribution to creditors, or
increasing the amount owed to creditors who must later compete for
the same available assets. The owners obtain no benefits, but the
creditors incur additional losses as a result of the continued
operation.
117.

P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 100.

118. The relevant period may have been four months, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (a) (1) (1976), or
one year, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1976).
119. Although the specification of a reason or reasons for a particular business failure is
usually highly speculative, there is a strong consensus as to the central role of poor management.See, e.g., J. ARGENTI, CORPORATE COLLAPSE 34 (1976) (99% of business failures due to
bad management, according to C.A. Thorn, an English insolvency specialist); A. DEWING,
L POLICY OF CoRPoRATIoNs 1418-19 (1953); DUN & BRADSTREEr, INC., THE BusiNmss
FAEwuIw RECORD 3 (1976) (90% due to managerial problems, based on data derived from
FINANc

interviews with creditors).
120.

P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 42.

121.

Id. at 40-43.
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Finally, the state remedies/bankruptcy system should protect
creditors from the loss of the assets by fraud. If it fails to do so, it
can coerce only the honest debtor, who may in turn become extinct
as dishonesty prospers. The most common frauds with which the
state remedies system deals are: (1) the fraudulent transfer of assets of the debtor to others; (2) the fraudulent concealment of assets from the system; and (3) the fraudulent acquisition of new assets on credit.
The state remedies subsystem counters the debtor's incentives
or tendencies toward waste, fraud and unfair distribution of assets
in two ways. First, the judgment creditor can cause the assets to be
seized by the sheriff or removed from the control of the debtor by
other legal process, thereby assuring that the assets cannot be
transferred, concealed, converted or consumed. The awarding of
priority to creditors in the order in which they take action to seize
the property tends to minimize the amount of time the debtor will
be in control of the nonviable, insolvent enterprise and in a position
to injure creditors. The primary problem with this remedy, as has
already been discussed, is that the process of seizure itself usually
destroys a substantial part of the value that might otherwise be
available to creditors. 12
Second, through the law of fraudulent conveyances and the equitable powers of the court to enjoin waste or appoint receivers, the
state remedies subsystem offers theoretically complete protection
against specific acts of waste, fraud or unfair distribution. Fraudulent transfers can be set aside for the benefit of the creditor,'12 specific acts of waste can be enjoined, 124 and a receiver can be appointed
where there is a demonstrable danger of loss, deterioration, or other
impairment of the value of property that will be necessary to satisfy
any judgment in the action.
In practice this array of state remedies is notoriously ineffective. The difficulties with the law of fraudulent conveyances are primarily procedural. Ordinarily the creditor is not permitted to discover what transfers the debtor has made until after judgment has
12 5

122. The value is not merely removed from the pool of assets available to creditors, a
portion of it is lost to the economy as a whole. This occurs partly because the assets are not
transferred to an ultimate user, but rather to the creditor who must then incur the expense of
locating and selling them to a user. In some markets, such as restaurant equipment, the cost
of such relocation and sale is typically half or more of the market value of the asset.
123. This can be accomplished under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act which
has been adopted in 23 states, or other fraudulent conveyancing acts. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 9
726.01 (1981); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 428.010-.090 (1959).
124. 93 C.J.S. Waste § 16 (1956).
125. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 19 (1952).

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
been entered in the debt collection action.'1 The creditor then must
bear the expense of a second lawsuit to establish the fraudulent nature of the conveyance. Generally the suit to set aside the conveyance proceeds by the ordinary rules of procedure on regular court
dockets; 12 thus it may take the creditor years to undo what the
debtor has done in minutes. Often the remedy proves to be an illusion because the transferee is judgment proof and the property
transferred has been transferred a second time-to a bona fide purchaser who will prevail over the creditor. 12
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the creditor
may "disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon
the property conveyed,"' 1-9 but in doing so without a prior determination by the court that the conveyance is fraudulent, the creditor
risks liability to the transferee for wrongful execution. 1°
The most common kind of waste of corporate assets, poor management, is not amenable to cure through the injunctive powers of
the courts. The complexity of business management has led to development of the rule that courts will not interfere in the internal
management of corporations except in cases of fraud, bad faith,
gross mismanagement or ultra vires acts.13 In the rare cases where
126. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421
U.S. 914 ("There is no right to discovery of assets prior to recovery of judgment."); Gangemi
v. Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19 (D. Del. 1967) (pretrial discovery not a substitute for the creditor's
bill). In the relatively rare instance where the creditor has already discovered the transfer
prior to bringing the main action, some jurisdictions permit joinder of the suit to set aside the
transfer with the main action, and permit discovery to go forward in the suit to set aside the
transfer. See, e.g., Churchill v. Palmer, 57 Mich. App. 210, 213-14, 226 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1975);
FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (b). If, on the other hand, the creditor is aware only that the debtor is in
financial difficulty, the creditor would be unable to withstand a motion to dismiss the creditor's bill. See Iroquois Oil & Gas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 1 F.R.D. 201 (E.D. Ill. 1940) (" [I] t is
not the intent of [Rule 18 (b) ] that a suit to set aside conveyances in fraud of creditors may
succeed upon any lesser or smaller allegations than previous [to adoption of that Rule].").
Despite the wording of Rule 18 (b), it is inconceivable to this writer that courts would permit
general discovery of the financial affairs of a defendant upon mere allegations that a debt is
owing and the debtor is in financial difficulty. Rule 18 (b) must be read to exclude by implication joinder of the main claim with supplementary proceedings or a creditor's bill brought
primarily to discover rather than avoid such transfers.
127. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Creditor'sBill §§ 65-90 (1981).
128. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act an action may not be maintained
against a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the
purchase, and no exception is provided for cases in which the transferor has squandered or
retransferred that consideration. UNIF. FRAUD. CONV. AcT § 9.
129. Id.
130. Comment, The Law of FraudulentConveyances in North Carolina:An Analysis
and Comparison with the Uniform FraudulentConveyances Act, 50 N.C.L. REv. 873, 900
(1972). (" [I] f in a subsequent separate action the conveyance is held not fraudulent, the
creditor may be held liable for substantial damages.").
19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 984 (1940).
131.
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they do interfere, the device used tends to be the appointment of a
receiver rather than the issuance of an injunction. 3
Although the remedy of appointment of a receiver is immediate' 3and direct in performing the functions considered in this subpart, it is usually unavailable to creditors and seldom employed
when it is. The general rule is that a receiver will not be appointed at
the instance of a simple contract creditor without a lien or some
peculiar equity or beneficial interest in specific property.134 This restriction would seem to make the remedy generally unavailable to
unsecured creditors; this conclusion is further supported by the rule
that the equitable remedy of appointment of a receiver is unavailable where a legal remedy such as attachment or execution can be
employed.5 In situations where it is available, appointment is discretionary and it is the policy of the courts to use it sparingly. 136 As a
remedy it is generally unattractive to an unsecured creditor because
it gives him no advantage in his struggle for priority, yet exposes
him to a substantial risk if the appointment is later determined to
have been improvident.137
The diligent creditor will usually find it to his advantage to ignore these specific protections offered by the state remedies subsystem until the more basic remedy of seizure and sale of the debtor's
property has failed. As a result, two characteristics of the functioning of the state remedies subsystem emerge: creditors concentrate
their efforts on the early seizure of assets and the specific protections have only a minor effect on the actions of owners in control of
the insolvent enterprise. Seizure of the debtor's assets, the same
mechanism that performs the functions of coercing payment and
closing the business, also performs the function of avoiding waste,
fraud and unfair distribution. The debtor, so long as he is in physical control of the assets, has a generally free rein in their disposition.
132. See, e.g., National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 114 Kan. 456, 458, 219 P. 261,
262 (1923) ("The courts are not the business managers of corporations and cannot become
such except through the appointment of receivers to attain some specific object required by

law.").
133. The appointment may be accomplished immediately upon filing suit against the
debtor, and when necessary to avoid immediate injury, may be accomplished ex parte. See
cases cited at 65 AM. JuR. 2D Receivers §§ 97-98 (1972).
134. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 11 (b) (1952).
135. E.g., Hawkins v. Aldridge, 211 Ind. 332, 7 N.E.2d 34 (1937) (court refused appointment of a receiver to take possession of property defendant was alleged to be fraudulently transferring or concealing because, under the circumstances, plaintiff would be entitled
to a prejudgment writ of attachment).
136. See 65 Am. JUR. 2D Receivers § 19 (1972).
137. See, e.g., Lyon v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 48 Mont. 591,140 P. 86
(1914).
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In the bankruptcy subsystem the function of controlling waste,
fraud and unfair distributions is accomplished without the necessity of closing the debtor's business. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy case the debtor is, to use Glenn's terminology, "within the
control of the (Bankruptcy) Court."3 The debtor must file a detailed statement of his financial affairs and schedules of his debts
and assets promptly after filing the case.139He must appear at a
meeting of creditors to be examined by interested parties,' ° and
other means of discovery are continuously available during the pendency of the case. 141If the debtor remains in control of an operating
business, he must file monthly reports of the operation of the business." From the time of the commencement of the case, the court
may appoint an examiner or a trustee to investigate the acts and
conduct of the debtor and the desirability of continuing the operation of the business.1" With regard to transactions accomplished
only shortly before filing of the bankruptcy case, the trustee is
vested retroactively with all of the powers which unsecured creditors would have had in the state remedies subsystem to set aside
fraudulent transfers,1" powers to equitably subordinate debt owing
to owners of the enterprise,'" and with additional powers to attack
specific transactions that are not in the best interests of creditors. '
Misconduct by the debtor during the bankruptcy case can result in
denial of the debtor's discharge, " removal of the debtor from con138. Glenn, Essentialsof Bankruptcy: Preventionof Fraud,and Control of Debtor, 23
VA. L. Rzv. 373, 373 (1937).
139. See supra note 40.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (Supp. III 1979).
141. See, e.g., Fan. R. BANK. P. 205 (a).
142. Id. 11-30.
143. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106, 1302(a) and (c) (Supp. III 1979).
144. Id.§544 (b).
145. Id. § 510. Under the doctrine of equitable subordination the bankruptcy court can
subordinate debts owing to corporate principals to debts owing to other creditors of the cor-

poration. The doctrine of equitable subordination is principally a functional substitute for
fraudulent conveyance law, employed primarily in situations where analysis under fraudulent conveyance law would become too complex or administratively burdensome. The doctrine is available to creditors only in the bankruptcy system. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors,90 HAsv. L. REv. 505, 517-36 (1979).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 547(d) (Supp. III 1979) (power to set aside preferential transfers
made within 90 days before filing of the petition, or one year if the transfer was made to
insiders); id. § 544 (a) (trustee vested with the rights and powers of an execution creditor and
a bona fide purchaser of the debtor's real property as of the time of filing of the petition); id. §
648 (power to set aside fraudulent transfers made within one year before filing of the petition
is almost identical to the power given creditors under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act).
147. Id. § 727.
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trol of the business, "sinvestigation by the trustee '9 or the United
States Attorney,150 criminal prosecution for bankruptcy crimes,15 or
imprisonment of the debtor or its officers for contempt of court. 15
These restrictions, in the aggregate, are far better calculated to control fraud, waste and unfair distribution of assets than are those of
the state remedies subsystem. 5
E. Coordinatingthe Collection Efforts of Creditors
The debtor in financial difficulty almost invariably has not one,
but several creditors, and typically those creditors have a variety of
claims. 1M One may be fully secured by a first mortgage on property
of the debtor, another may hold a junior mortgage, and a third may
be unsecured. A creditor may have special rights or remedies because it is a taxing authority, 15 a laborer, 15 or a person whom the
debtor is obligated by court order to support.'57 It is common to
speak of creditors or claims as having certain priorities among
themselves, and to justify those priorities either on the basis of contracts between the debtor and creditor with prior notice to other
creditors'5 or public policy. 15
148.
149.
150.

Id. §§ 1104(a) (1), 1108.
Id. § 1106(a) (3).
18 U.S.C. § 3057 (Supp. III 1979).

151.

Id. § 152.

152. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. 1I 1979); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 405 (a) (1) (A) and (B), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978); Fro. R. BANKS. P. 920.
153. See generally Tobias, The Misbehaving Debtor: The Asset Wasting Debtor In
PossessionUnder Chapter11,in 1980 ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRuPrc LAW 47 (W. Norton Jr.

ed. 1980).
154. For an economic analysis of the impact of differing claims on the decision to file
for bankruptcy, see Bulow & Shoven, supra note 11, at 437.
155. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (6) (Supp. II 1979) (priority of taxes in bankruptcy
proceedings); 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976) (in the event of insolvency, whether or not bankruptcy
is filed, debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied); Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-719 (1966); FLA. STAT. § 197.056 (1981) (property taxes a first lien, superior to
all other liens).
156. E.g. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979) (priority of wages in bankruptcy proceedings); FLA. STAT. § 713.01-.38 (1981) (mechanics' liens, miscellaneous liens for laborers); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 513.470 (1981) (no property exempt from execution on the claims of a laborer to
the extent of $90).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (5) (Supp. III 1979) (claims for support nondischargeable in
bankruptcy); FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1) (1981) (exemption of earnings from personal services
ineffective against support claimant).
158. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financingand PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
159. See, e.g., Arner, The WorthierCreditors (And a Cheer for the King) Revisited,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 389 (1979) (justifying a priority for federal taxes in bankruptcy
proceedings).
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In fact such "priorities" are blurred in the operation of the
debtor's business, and become true priorities only when the time
and manner of liquidation have been fixed. For example, a debtor
who is forced to choose might use incoming rents to make his alimony payment rather than his first mortgage payment, even though
the latter is generally thought of as having priority. A mortgagor
may have contracted for a first mortgage on property only to find
later that the unpaid property taxes, " special assessments,16 1 and a
decline in the value of the property have left him without security.
Debtors in financial difficulty commonly ignore the "priority" of the
obligation to pay withheld taxes to the IRS and instead pay what
they regard as more pressing obligations that formally have a low
priority.1i
The speed with which a creditor can force liquidation and
thereby obtain a meaningful priority is therefore an essential element of the creditor's condition. Reflecting the importance of this
element, mortgages and security agreements, which are usually
drafted by creditors, provide that liquidation may be had either immediately upon default, or after a "grace period" of about ten to
1
thirty days. 6

There are strong public policy reasons, however, for not leaving
the timing of liquidation to the debtor and a single creditor to decide by contract. Liquidation forced by one creditor does more than
simply fix the priorities of creditors; it may also destroy asset values
and impair the ability of other creditors, both senior and junior, to
recover.1 Worse yet, the liquidation may be forced, and the destruction incurred, whether or not a fixing of priorities was actually
needed by the moving creditor. A typical example is the first mortgage holder on real estate who commences a foreclosure proceeding
shortly after default even though the value of the collateral is sufficiently in excess of the amount of the loan to ensure that the mortgage holder would incur no meaningful risk of loss by waiting. The
foreclosure proceeding may force a closing of the debtor's viable
business, thereby inflicting a loss on other creditors who were relying upon the debtor's future earnings for repayment.16 While the
160. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 197.056 (1981) (property taxes a first lien, superior to all
other liens).
161. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 599 (1952).
162. See, e.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978).
163. See, e.g., Am. Jua. LEGAL FoRMs 2D § 179.117 (1973) (New York mortgage form

providing acceleration of principal and interest after default in the payment of any installment "for days").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 21-39.
165. See supra text accompanying note 89.

1982:311

State Remedies/Bankruptcy System

loss thus inflicted may be justified by the fiction that the other creditors extended credit with knowledge of the mortgage holder's
rights, it should not be so justified. The values destroyed by the precipitous action of one creditor are real, and their loss is an aggregate
loss to the economy for which there may be no corresponding gain.
It is therefore likely that any coercive collection system will have
some mechanism for protecting other creditors from the precipitous
actions of one.
Such a mechanism is not apparent in the state remedies subsystem. The law seems to give any creditor the right to immediate
relief, irrespective of the interests of other creditors. For example,
under the Uniform Commercial Code, "the secured party's right to
possession of the collateral accrues on default unless otherwise
agreed in the security agreement." 1" The creditor may take possession immediately if he can do so without judicial process or breach
of the peace,187 even though there may be other liens against the
property."
Upon closer examination of the state remedies subsystem, however, a number of procedural barriers to immediate exercise of the
right are found to exist. "Breach of the peace" for purposes of Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code is defined such that the
debtor need only voice an objection in the vicinity and at the time of
the attempted retaking and the creditor is forced thereby to resort
to judicial process, 1" and suffer its delays. Similarly, except in cases
of fraud or concealment of property, general creditors must file suit
and reduce their claim to judgment before they may cause seizure of
the debtor's property. 170 The debtor must be located and served
with process. He is usually afforded twenty days or more in which to
answer or appear. ' After judgment is entered he is usually afforded
ten days in which to supersede the judgment before execution can
be had. 172 After execution the sale procedure itself may consume another month.'7 There can be little doubt that these delays, like their
counterparts in the mortgage foreclosure or sale under deed of trust
166. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972 Official Comment).
167. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977).
168. Cf. id. § 9-504 (4) (disposition of collateral by secured party discharges any security interest or lien subordinate thereto).
169. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 550 F.2d 256, 258 (5th Cir. 1977); Census
Federal Credit Union v. Wann, 403 N.E.2d 348, 350-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
170. See supra note 19.
171. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) (20 days).
172. E.g., id. 62 (a) (10 days).
173. See supra note 23.
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process, 4 exist in part to allow sufficient time for the debtor to tap
any available sources of funding or liquidate assets to meet the obligation. The public filing of suit together with these delays, permits
other creditors to learn of the debtor's financial problems, usually
through credit reporting agencies, and to take action to protect
their interests. In other words, the state remedies mechanism for
protecting other creditors from the precipitous actions of one is to
provide for an unavoidable delay after default in payment before
one creditor's action against property of the debtor can become
irreversible.
The mechanism seems to assume that the debtor will take action during the delay to avoid serious forfeiture or destruction of
values, and that less than serious forfeitures or destructions are
merely the price of affording creditors an effective coercive collection remedy. Its most obvious shortcoming is that it fails to recognize other creditors as interested parties entitled to notice and does
not afford them the right to protect themselves from the overly aggressive creditor in situations in which the debtor does not have the
inclination or incentive to do so.
The bankruptcy subsystem formally recognizes the interrelatedness of creditors' remedies. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy
proceeding all collection efforts are automatically stayed. 175 The
trustee or debtor-in-possession then has generally free rein to use
the property "in the best interests of the estate," i.e., to maximize
the aggregate return to creditors and equity interests in the enterprise.176 An individual creditor can have the stay lifted and proceed
against his collateral only if continuation of the stay threatens that
creditor with loss or the debtor has no equity in .the property and
the property is not necessary to the effective reorganization (operation) of the business.77 The bankruptcy subsystem thus treats the
debtor and its creditors as a single system, and conditions its coercive collection remedy upon noninjury to other creditors. In performing this function of protecting creditors from each other, the
bankruptcy subsystem again gives express consideration to a problem which is dealt with in the state remedies subsystem as merely a
174. See Randolph, The Mortgagee's Interest in Rents: Some Policy Considerations
and Proposals,29 KAN. L. REv.1, 6-8 (1980) (" [I]
n virtually all jurisdictions the customary
foreclosure method provides at least some period of redemption prior to foreclosure even
when there is no contest. The typical period, even in private foreclosure states, is ninety days

or more.").
175. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979).
176. See 4 COLLIER ON BANruprcy 704.01 - .03 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
177.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. HI 1979).
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byproduct of the process for coercive collection.
In addition to this substantive coordination of the rights of
competing creditors, the bankruptcy subsystem achieves efficiencies by coordinating the actions of creditors procedurally. In the
state remedies subsystem each creditor must work in competition
with other creditors to obtain judgments, locate the debtor's assets,
and act against them. Each must obtain service of process on the
debtor, and each might take a deposition in aid of execution and
examine the debtor regarding the same matters. 8 Each must effect
a sale of the debtor's assets, and as a result a single asset may be the
subject of several sales occurring in sequence. 179 For example, after a
judicial or execution sale, senior lienholders whose rights could not
be foreclosed by the sale, or junior lienholders who were not joined
in a foreclosure proceeding can initiate a second sale proceeding.
In the bankruptcy subsystem there is a single proceeding, combining claims that might otherwise be litigated in various courts
throughout the United States.180 Process need be served on the
debtor only once, and creditors are then notified by the bankrupty
court of the proceeding and the necessity to file claims18O' Any creditor may examine the debtor or listen to another creditor's examination of him at the first meeting of creditors or an examination scheduled for that purpose. 18 Assets need be sold only once, and the
trustee is charged with distributing the proceeds to the creditors
entitled to them. iss Thus the bankruptcy subsystem is able to elimi178. Nor is it likely that the attorneys taking a later deposition will use the earlier one.
The later attorneys may not be aware of the taking of the earlier deposition or the litigation in
which it was taken. The deposition may be impractical to use because it has not been transcribed. If it has been transcribed, local practice may prohibit a nonparty from access to the
deposition, because it is "sealed". FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b).
179. E.g., Matless v. Sundin, 94 Iowa 111, 62 N.W. 662 (1895).
180. An out-of-state creditor can often obtain jurisdiction over the debtor in his home
state. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Gray v. Ainerican Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d. 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Furthermore,
creditors using their state remedies usually have the privilege of venue in their own county.
See cases cited infra note 214. In the bankruptcy subsystem, a single bankruptcy court will
have exclusive jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor, wherever located. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471 (Supp. III 1979); FED. R. BANKR. P. 116 (c). Claims against the debtor are filed in that
bankruptcy court, and objections to claims are heard by it. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502(b)
(Supp. 1I 1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1473 (Supp. II 1979); FED. R. BANK". P. 302 (b), 509. Although
some litigation by or against the bankruptcy estate can, and some small claims brought by the
trustee must, proceed in other venues, the bankruptcy court has broad powers to control
venue in the interests of justice and for the convenience of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1473,
1478, 1473 (b), 1475 (Supp. III 1979).
181.
FED. R. BANKR. P., Official Form No. 12.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (Supp. III 1979); FED. R. BANKS. P. 205.
183. The trustee may sell the property, free and clear of all liens against it. 11 U.S.C. §
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nate substantial duplication of procedures that routinely occur in
the state remedies subsystem.

F. Resolving Disputes Between Debtor and Creditor
Before the legal system can assist the creditor by coercing payment of a debt, there must be a determination that one is owing. In
the state remedies subsystem this determination is made in a separate action brought by each creditor. Although there is no real dispute as to the existence of the debt in the vast majority of actions
brought against debtors in financial difficulty, these actions follow
procedures designed to identify and resolve disputes. Creditors incur substantial attorney's fees and costs to comply with these procedures, and in many cases those costs are later passed on, in whole or
in part, to the debtors. 18' Upon compliance, judgments are entered
by default or on motion for summary judgment. 18
In most of these lawsuits the debtor would gladly have conceded liability but for the fact that his concession would have resulted in the immediate entry of judgment, thereby hastening the
day when the axe would fall on the debtor's business, or at least its
assets. The well-advised debtor with a viable business attempts to
maximize the delays, and uses the time to seek a solution to his cash
flow problems. Defenses are interposed not for the purpose of reducing the creditor's recovery, but to gain time. The debtor finds
it to his advantage to minimize communication with creditors, and
87
to deny that he is in financial difficulty.1
That such elaborate proceedings are not necessary to provide
the debtor with a reasonably accurate determination of the existence and amount of the debt is apparent from an examination of
the way in which the bankruptcy subsystem provides that function.
Within ten days after the order for relief in a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor must file sworn schedules listing all persons who
363 (f) (Supp. III 1979). The liens then attach to the proceeds of sale. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.07 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
184. This would occur in cases where 1) the contract between the debtor and creditor

provided that the debtor would pay those costs, and 2) the debt was in fact collected.
185. In some jurisdictions it is customary to file a general denial of the plaintiff's claim,
thereby necessitating summary judgment proceedings even in cases where the debtor has no
defense. See FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDuRE 422-23 (1978) ("The traditions of the bar are such that routine general denials are
habitually filed in many states when they should not be.").
186. See supra note 185.
187. P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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might claim against him, the amount owing to each, and whether
the claim is disputed. 8' 8The debtor has a sound incentive to achieve
a complete and accurate listing: if a creditor is not listed, and does
not receive notice of the proceeding, the claim owing to that creditor
is not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding." The court mails
notice of the bankruptcy proceeding to each listed creditor by ordinary mail, and the creditors have approximately six months in
which to file a sworn statement of their claim.89 The bankruptcy
trustee is charged with examining both the schedules and the proofs
of claim and objecting to any claim that appears to be improper."'
Objections are heard and determined by the court before the proceeds of the estate are divided among the creditors. 9
The filing of a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding is a
simpler and far less costly process than obtaining a judgment by
default in the state remedies subsystem. What would have been
dozens of lawsuits in the state court system, with attendant
problems of personal service of process, personal appearances by
litigants or their attorneys, and the preparation of dozens of affidavits and final judgments, is resolved in the bankruptcy subsystem
without personal service of process or personal appearance, in a single order of the court allowing claims based on the schedules, and
usually a one page proof of claim filed by each creditor. '9 Although
claims may be foreclosed because a creditor does not receive his notice of the bankruptcy proceeding and is thus deprived of the opportunity to participate," such instances are probably rare. Even if the
correctly addressed notice does not reach the creditor, the creditor
is likely to discover the bankruptcy proceeding by other means
within the six month claim filing period.19
188. FED. R. BANKR. P. 108.
189. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (3) (Supp. III 1979).
190. Creditors are given notice of the need to file claims ten days before the date set for
the first meeting of creditors, and have until six months after that date to file proofs of claim.
FaD. R. BAuNK. P. 203 (a) (1), 302(e), Official Form 12.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 704(4) (Supp. III 1979).

192.

FED.

R.

BANKE.

P. 306, 308.

193. Id., Official Form 15.
194. The debt will be discharged if it is properly scheduled. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (3)
(Supp. III 1979). The debtor must exercise reasonable diligence to discover and schedule the
creditor's correct address. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.13 (L. King 15th ed. 1979). However, if the debtor has done so and the address is nevertheless insufficient to effect notice to
the creditor, the debt is discharged, notwithstanding the lack of notice. See Zinn v. Hallock 86
N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1949) (creditor's home address was scheduled same as in current telephone directory, but creditor had moved to a new address a few months before, and
did not receive notice of first meeting; debtor held discharged as to claim).
195. The time from the filing of the bankruptcy petition to the end of the claims filing
period is always more than six months. See supra note 190. If the creditor initiates any collec-
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Although statistics are not available on the relative frequency
of disputes as to the existence or amount of the debt in the state
remedies and bankruptcy subsystems,' the bankruptcy subsystem
has two characteristics which tend to cause it to generate fewer disputes. First, the bankruptcy subsystem makes information about
the debtor's financial condition available to creditors before they
are required to invest the expense of resolving an existing dispute.
The creditor who is about to embark on substantial litigation over
the existence or amount of his claim can first obtain the debtor's
schedules from the bankruptcy court, and from them get at least a
rough idea of what proportion of the claim likely would be paid in
the event that the creditor were successful in the litigation. Thus
creditors in the bankruptcy subsystem are able to sort out the cases
in which the debtor's poor financial condition causes the amount
truly in issue to be substantially less than the face amounts of the
debts, and to settle or abandon them. In the state remedies subsystem, the creditor must first litigate the claim, and only then is he
permitted to discover the percentage which can be paid. 197 Second,
in the bankruptcy subsystem the dispute resolution process has
been separated from the processes which close the debtor's business
and liquidate its assets. The trustee's duty is to maximize the net
return to the estate from sale or liquidation of the business, and he
is under no artificial deadline in doing so. In fulfilling this duty he is
unaffected by the rapidity with which claims are resolved.'" Thus,
in the bankruptcy subsystem the debtor (or the trustee acting in his
place) can concede liability or settle his disputes without fear that
his business will then be immediately closed and liquidated.
In addition to resolving disputes concerning the existence or
amount of the debt, the state remedies/bankruptcy system must
also resolve disputes concerning the manner in which they may be
collected. In the state remedies subsystem these disputes usually
concern whether the creditor's collection action has taken the
tion activity during that period of time, the debtor will notify him of the bankruptcy proceeding to obtain the benefit of the automatic stay against collection efforts, and to ensure that the
debt will be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (3) (A) (Supp. III 1979). It is seldom to the
debtor's disadvantage to do so, since the creditor, upon filing a claim, would merely share pro
rata in the assets available for distribution to creditors.
196. The Brookings study found that at least one objection to a proof of claim was
made in 31 % of business bankruptcy cases and in 74% of Chapter 11cases. STANLEY & GIRTH,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 137 (1971).
197. See supra note 126.
198. As assets are liquidated, the proceeds are deposited into a checking account. FED.
R. BANKR. P. 605 (b). They may be transferred to an interest-bearing account, or partial distributions may be made to creditors, while the trustee awaits the court's determination of
claims. FED. R. BANKR. P. 605 (b), 308.

1982:311

State Remedies/Bankruptcy System

proper form. They include such matters as whether appropriate notice was given to the debtor, whether the postjudgment remedy selected was the proper one to reach a particular kind of property, and
which creditor should be paid first from the proceeds of liquidation. 10 Noticeably absent are disputes as to whether the debtor's
business is viable, whether the debtor should be entering into particular transactions in light of the fact that he is insolvent, what
manner of liquidation would bring the highest price for creditors, or
how the system can best perform the other functions described in
this article.
The state remedies subsystem seems to operate on the assumption that if the coercive collection system sets forth collection procedures, including a succession of deadlines for the debtor to meet,
with adequate notice of each, the parties, in pursuing their own interests, will give effect to the public policies underlying the system.
If the debtor's business is viable, he will be able to find refinancing
or convince the creditors to wait. If the insolvent debtor is entering
into irresponsible transactions, creditors will know about it and
promptly put him out of business. If there must be a liquidation, the
debtor will do it himself, prior to the seizure of his assets by creditors. These assumptions, for the most part, are unwarranted. The
debtor's financial difficulty itself usually makes it impossible to find
refinancing,2 and responsible creditors cannot give the debtor more
time without losing their priority to irresponsible creditors. 21 The
state remedies subsystem fails to afford creditors a practical means
of discovering whether the debtor is operating responsiblym until it
is too late to make any difference.2m A debtor who is under a deadline to sell his business is in no position to bargain for a good price
and has no incentive to bargain for a poor one.2 Instead of reaching
its objective of forcing the debtor into realistic, productive action,
the effect of the state remedies process is to thrust the debtor into a
downward spiral in which the existence of collection proceedings
prevents constructive action.
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that in
dealing with the debtor in financial difficulty the bankruptcy sub199.
200.

See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN & J. LNanDEs, DEBTops Ain CRErroRs 1-380 (1978).

Private lenders will, of course, prefer to lend to firms that are not in financial

difficulty since that practice presumably involves less risk.
201. See supra text accompanying note 87.
202. See supra note 126.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
204.
If the debtor sells for a relatively poor price the proceeds will go largely, if not
entirely, to creditors. If so, the debtor has little or nothing to lose by gambling on the possibility, however small, of obtaining a better price later. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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system performs the functions of the state remedies/bankruptcy
system better than the state remedies subsystem in nearly every
respect. Why the performance of these functions, in most instances
where debtors encounter financial difficulties, has remained largely
within the domain of the state remedies subsystem is the subject of
Part II.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE REMEDIES AND
BANKRUPTCY SUBSYSTEMS OF THE STATE REMEDIES/BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM

In examining the manner in which each of the subsystems performed various functions, it was assumed in Part I of this article
that each case was dealt with entirely by one or the other of these
subsystems, and that the function of each subsystem was unaffected
by the existence of the other. In fact the two subsystems operate
concurrently, and interact in a variety of ways. Through that interaction they combine to form a single system, with operating characteristics found in neither subsystem. This result comes about without plan, inadvertently.
In concept, the state remedies subsystem and the bankruptcy
subsystem provide alternate means for the creditor to coerce payment from the debtor who is in financial difficulty. Access to the
bankruptcy subsystem is restricted procedurally in that the creditor usually must combine its claim with those of two other creditors,
and their claims must, in the aggregate, total at least $5000, M but
there is no requirement that the creditor first attempt collection
through state remedies. Creditors may ignore their state remedies
and instead petition the debtor directly into involuntary bankruptcy.2"

In light of the clear superiority of the bankruptcy subsystem in
maximizing the aggregate return to creditors from the debtor in financial difficulty, one might expect that frequently creditors would
elect to proceed in bankruptcy. They do not. Hundreds of
thousands of lawsuits are filed annually against debtors in financial
difficulty, but less than 1400 involuntary bankruptcy petitions are
205. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. III 1979).
206. To be a petitioning creditor it is only necessary that the creditor be the holder of
an unsecured, noncontingent claim. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1) (Supp. III 1979). A "claim" is
defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,.
.. matured [or] disputed .... Id. § 101 (4) (A).
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filed. 207
Several factors contribute to the creditor's preference for the
state remedies subsystem. One such factor is that the typical creditor must incur some risks, expenses, or both to enter the bankruptcy
system that need not be incurred to enter the state remedies system. The Bankruptcy Code provides that if the court dismisses an
involuntary petition for any reason, it has the discretion to award
the debtor costs, attorney's fees, and damages incurred by the
debtor as a result of any seizure of the debtor's property.2m The most
likely causes of such a dismissal and award would be failure of the
petition or proof to satisfy the Bankruptcy Code requirements as to
the number of petitioning creditors or the debtor's "equitable insolvency."20 The prudent creditor will wish to make some investigation of these matters and perhaps others before filing. There is, of
course, no assurance that the investigation will enable the creditor
to reach the correct conclusion. By contrast, to enter the state remedies subsystem without risk of being held liable for the debtor's attorney's fees, the creditor must know only that the debt is owing
and the debtor is in default; this information is virtually always in
the creditor's possession.
A second factor which contributes to the creditor's preference
for the state remedies subsystem is that creditors' attorneys are
often unfamiliar with bankruptcy practice. The bankruptcy subsystem is lodged in a separate, specialized court, with its own highly
complex substantive law and rules of practice. The specialization of
the court is reflected in a specialization of the bar, and the attorney
whose practice is not primarily in the bankruptcy court is often at a
substantial disadvantage. 210 As a result, creditors' attorneys sometimes exhibit an unwarranted preference for the state remedies
subsystem.
A third factor is geography. State courts are headquartered in
substantially every county in the United States and thus are accessible to creditors. By contrast, there are no more than four bankruptcy courts in any state. 21 1 Those courts may sit in several localities within the district, but they conduct limited operations in
207. One thousand three hundred and sixty-eight involuntary petitions were filed in
United States Bankruptcy Courts during the twelve month period ending December 31,1980.
ADMIN.

OFFICE OF THE U.S.

COURTS,

FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS FOR THE

TwKLvE-MoNrH PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1980, at A-75 [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS].

208.
209.
210.
211.

11 U.S.C. § 303 (f) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 303.
See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 95-96.
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 207, at A-72, A-73.
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outlying counties and generally do not reach most counties at all.
For example, the Northern District of Florida is composed of
twenty-two counties, and is more than three hundred miles in
length. The Bankrutpcy Clerk's office is located in Tallahassee, and
there are no branch offices. A single bankruptcy judge resides in
Tallahassee, and holds court in four locations in the district."2 By
contrast, the state remedies subsystem provides a clerk's office and
3
at least one county judge in every one of the twenty-two counties.21
Not only are there more courts available in the state remedies subsystem, that subsystem also tends to be more favorable to the creditor in the crucial matter of venue. Venue in the state remedies subsystem is often where the creditor is located,1 whereas in the
bankruptcy subsystem it is where the debtor is located.15 Convenience of venue can be a decisive advantage, particularly where the
debt is small.
A fourth factor is the way in which available assets are divided
among competing creditors in the two subsystems. Security interests and mortgages are accorded first priority in both subsystems. 216
In the bankruptcy subsystem the next priority goes to certain types
of debts, such as wage claims, employee benefits, taxes, consumer
deposits, and customs duties.217 Any remaining balance is divided
pro rata among the general (unsecured) creditors.1 8 In the state
remedies subsystem the granting of priority to unsecured claimants
on the basis of the nature of the debt is relatively rare. 21 9 Instead,

priority is given to unsecured creditors in the order in which they
take action to collect their debts. For example, assume that two
creditors obtained judgments and took all other actions necessary
to obtain liens against real property of the debtor. In the state remedies subsystem those creditors would be paid from proceeds of the
212. See FLA. B.J., Sept. 1979, at 588.
213. Id. at 575-83.
214. E.g., SAF-T-CLEAN, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967);
Lillis v. City of Big Timber, 103 Mont. 206,62 P.2d 219 (1936); Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co.
v. Mixon, 445 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. III 1979).
216. Some security interests or mortgages valid in the state remedies subsystem may
be avoided by the bankruptcy trustee, the most important category being preferential transfers made within a limited time prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See supra note
146.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. I1 1979).

218.

Id. § 726(a) (2).

219. Where public policy dictates that there should be a priority, the state remedies
subsystem generally gives the creditor a lien right on the condition that he retain possession
of the property, as in the case of personal property liens, or requires that he file a claim of lien,
as in the case of mechanics liens on real property.
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sale of the real property in the order in which they obtained their
judgment liens, before other creditors who have not obtained judgment liens.tm Thus, that subsystem offers more to the diligent creditor than the bankruptcy subsystem, whereas the creditor who realizes he has not been diligent often does not bother with collection
action at all.2 1
Probably the most important factor influencing creditors to
elect the state remedies subsystem is that, because of the diligent
creditor's ability to close prematurely the business, aggressive action in that subsystem can cause the debtor to make voluntary payment to the moving creditor. To understand how this works, consider a model of a business in financial difficulty. The business is
operating at a particular scale, that can be changed only with difficulty, and probably only with substantial expense. At that scale the
business produces a cash income, which we will assume is sufficient
to meet its cash expenses and leave some remaining cash to pay
creditors. That cash, however, is insufficient to pay all creditors the
amounts immediately due them. Under these circumstances, the
owners of the business will seek to allocate the cash among creditors
in a manner that will permit the business to continue to operate.
Such an allocation would seldom be pro rata. Some creditors have
the power to cause the debtor more expense or damage than others,
or to cause it sooner, and the debtor will naturally tend to prefer
them. For example, a secured creditor may be able to accelerate an
irreplaceable mortgage, m thereby necessitating a Chapter 11 proceeding to reinstate it,22 or he may be able to replevy the collateral
in a week or two,224 bringing operations to a halt. Such creditors can
220.

See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 46-49; 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 282-83

(1969).
221.

The Brookings study found that only 17% of the unsecured creditors of business
bankrupts bothered to file claims. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 196, at 90. Stanley and Girth
"encounter (ed) a few creditors who had filed routinely and were pleasantly surprised to be
paid in full since so many others had given up." Id. at 89.
222.
Once a mortgage has been accelerated, the state remedies subsystem generally
does not permit reinstatement. See, e.g., Petti v. Putignano, 393 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979); United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593 (1964); Graf v.
Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1,171 N.E. 884 (1930); Damet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 72 Okla. 122,
179 P. 760 (1919); but see CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924 (c) (West 1954); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 57
(1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.30 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 404 (Purdon 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 57-1-31 (1953).

223. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a) (8), 1124(2) (Supp. III 1979).
224. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 78.055-.067 (1975) (hearing five to ten days after filing of
the complaint at which the court may order issuance of a writ of replevin); Mo. R. Civ. P.
99.03-.05 (after filing of complaint court may order substantially immediate seizure, with
post seizure hearing); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7102 (McKinney 1980) (after filing of complaint
court may order substantially immediate seizure with postseizure hearing).
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usually demand and receive their full monthly payments, even if
that leaves the debtor with no cash to pay to unsecured creditors.
At the time of default the unsecured creditor has no immediate
remedy, and therefore is often ignored in the debtor's allocation.
However, the unsecured creditor can generate leverage by pushing a
state suit to the brink of execution. The debtor must then reallocate
his resources to take account of the shift in the balance of power
among the creditors. For the first general creditors to move against a
debtor in financial difficulty, particularly if their debts are small,
the reward is often payment in full.
When an unsecured creditor receives such payment, and the
periodm during which it can be avoided as a preference expires
without the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the result is the same as
if the creditor had received a legal priority over other creditors who
were not paid. This priority may be over other unsecured creditors,
creditors who would have received a public policy priority in bankruptcy, or in some cases even over secured creditors. Two examples
will help to illustrate this interaction between the legal priority of a
creditor and the priority which the debtor, in light of the creditor's
leverage, sees fit to give him.
Debtors in financial difficulty often "borrow" from the United
States government by failing to pay over to the government taxes
that have been withheld from their employees.m The result is a debt
to the government that has priority over the claims of unsecured
creditors.Y The debtor, however, may use the proceeds of withholding to pay an aggressive unsecured creditor. The tax lien may follow
the payment into the hands of the creditor m but, as a practical matter, the funds will be quickly retransferred or commingled so as to
foreclose the government's claim to them.m The unsecured creditor
has been accorded a de facto priority over the government's lien.
Commercial banks commonly take a security interest in the accounts receivable of a debtor. Under the agreement between the
parties the debtor is permitted to collect the accounts and use the
proceeds for business purposes, on the assumption that new accounts will thereby be created.m° However, the debtor can use the
225. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (Supp. III 1979).
226. See supra note 162.
227. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1976).
228. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
229. See United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664,668 (D. Nev. 1963) (" [A tax] lien
is enforceable as a lien only insofar as lienor is able to follow, locate and control the specific
property.. ."); but cf. United States v. R.J.C. Ltd., 69-1 U.S.T.C. 9252 (E.D. Va. 1969).
230. Such agreements are specifically authorized by U.C.C. § 9-205 (1977).
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proceeds of some of the accounts to pay a troublesome unsecured
creditor and be unable to replace the accounts so applied. To the
extent that this occurs, the troublesome unsecured creditor, in effect, has been accorded a priority over the secured creditor.
In both of these examples an unsecured creditor obtained a
higher priority by proceeding in the state remedies subsystem. Had
the creditor proceeded immediately in the bankruptcy subsystem,
that would not have been possible. In bankruptcy, creditor's priorities are fixed at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition,2 1
and cannot thereafter be altered by payment.
While the ability of state remedies action to cause the debtor to
alter priorities in favor of the aggressive creditor makes the state
remedies subsystem attractive to creditors, it is important to note
that the reallocation does little to advance the public policies underlying the coercive collection system. The aggressive creditor is
paid more, but another creditor is paid less. Nothing has been done
to alleviate the debtor's financial difficulties or to assure responsible
control of the business.
Ironically, the debtor, at least in the crucial, early stages of his
financial difficulties, usually shares the creditor's preference for the
state remedies subsystem. He fears the stigma of the bankruptcy
subsystem,m its substantial administrative expenses,-3 and the pos-

sibility that control of the business will be taken from him.2 But
the debtor's initial preference for the state remedies subsystem is
231. In some respects they are fixed retroactively as of the beginning of the preference
period by 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. III 1979) which permits the trustee to avoid most transactions that improve a creditor's position during the preference period.
232. See id. § 549.
233. Included with the psychological and social aspect of the bankruptcy stigma is a
very concrete economic problem: suppliers and others with incomplete information may unjustifiably refuse to deal with the firm that has filed a bankruptcy petition because they misconstrue the firm's position. See P. NELSON, supra note 12, at 22.
234. In a Chapter 11 proceeding administrative expenses would include fees and expenses for the trustee or examiner, and the attorneys, accountants, or appraisers employed by
them, the attorneys for the creditor's committee and the debtor, and various other parties
who make a substantial contribution to the case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303 (i) (1) (a), 503 (b) (Supp.
III 1979). Although statistics are not kept as to the amount of these expenses, they are "quite
substantial." COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 13. Expenses of administration have been
recorded as 21.2% of distributions to creditors in Chapter 13 cases, and as 22.9% of the total
realized in asset bankruptcy cases. Id. at 131; TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note
3, at 8.
Under Chapter 11 a trustee may be appointed "if such appointment is in the
235.
11
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate ....
U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (2) (Supp. III 1979). "Unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may
operate the debtor's business." Id. § 1108. Collier suggests that the test for ouster of the
debtor's management is more than merely the availability of better management, but that the
test might be satisfied if current management has no interest in the estate and better manage-
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not based upon these fears as much as on the lack of an imminent
threat from the state remedies subsystem together with the knowledge that the bankruptcy subsystem's protections will still be available later when they are actually needed.2 The debtor wants as
much time as possible for the business to improve its performance.
By allowing matters to proceed in the state remedies subsystem until they constitute an immediate threat, and only then filing bankruptcy, the debtor can maximize the delays available to him.27
The result is that the two subsystems of the state remedies/
bankruptcy system, though formally alternatives for the creditors,
tend to be used in sequence. The creditor initially elects to file in the
state remedies subsystem because it is relatively risk-free, the creditor's attorney feels comfortable in it, the courts are easily accessible,
priority runs to the diligent creditor, and the prospects that the
debtor can be compelled to squeeze out a preferential payment for a
diligent creditor are usually reasonably good. The debtor is content
to let the matter remain pending in the state remedies subsystem
until liquidation of his assets by that subsystem becomes imminent.
At that time it will usually be to the debtor's advantage to move the
case to the bankruptcy subsystem by means of a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7, 11, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, matters
first proceed through the state remedies subsystem until its succession of deadlines has passed and then begin again in the bankruptcy
subsystem. While the debtor may be squeezed into making payments at the state remedies stage, true coercion of collection at that
stage is impossible in ordinary cases because the debtor, even on the
eve of liquidation, can make his escape to the bankruptcy subsystem. Since, in the bankruptcy subsystem, the objective of coercing
payment is generally subordinated to those of protecting the viable
enterprise and maximizing the net return to creditors, in bankruptcy proceedings, the former objective is often slow in being accomplished. From the time of the filing of the petition in bankment is available. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1104.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1978). Thus the
debtor whose managerial ability is in question has reason to fear the bankruptcy subsystem.
236. The debtor can wait until the state remedies subsystem's interference with his
business becomes intolerable before filing a bankruptcy proceeding. The automatic stay protects the debtor from a sheriff's levy even if the bankruptcy proceeding is filed on the day
before the levy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (4) (Supp. III 1979).
237. Unlike the state remedies subsystem, the bankruptcy subsystem does not protect
the debtor with delays of a fixed, arbitrary period. See supra text accompanying notes 169-74.
The debtor, however, is entitled to notice and a hearing before he can be removed from control of the business, and the practicalities of providing them will necessarily result in some
delay, particularly since the bankruptcy court is often geographically distant from the petitioning creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (Supp. 11 1979); see also supra text accompanying
notes 211-12.

1982:311

State Remedies/Bankruptcy System

359

ruptcy, it is nearly always more than six months, and sometimes
several years, before the creditor can realize on its claim.' By the
time creditors have suffered the delays of both the state remedies
and bankruptcy subsystems the debtor's financial difficulties often
have resolved themselves, either by an upturn which made it possible for the debtor to satisfy the creditors or a downturn which left
the debtor with insufficient cash to continue operating, even without making payments to creditors. Rarely does the state remedies/
bankruptcy system close the business of a well-advised debtor or
liquidate its assets.2
This division of the coercive collection process into two successive stages has other adverse effects. The predictable delays inherent in the state remedies subsystem provide the debtor with ample
warning of the approaching necessity to submit to the control of the
bankruptcy court, thereby channelling the debtor into a bankruptcy planning process that will defeat many of the public policies
underlying the state remedies/bankruptcy system. During the delays of the state remedies stage the debtor can convert nonexempt
assets into an exempt form, enter into transactions that benefit the
owners at the expense of general creditors, take risks that would not
be permitted by the bankruptcy court, or liquidate assets in a manner different than that provided under bankruptcy law. 240
In an attempt to counter the effects of bankruptcy planning,
the bankruptcy subsystem grants to bankruptcy trustees some extraordinary powers to avoid transactions entered into shortly before
the filing of the bankruptcy case. Most prominent among them is
the power to avoid preferential transfers made within ninety days
before filing, or if the transfer was to an insider, within one year
before filing.241 Several commentators have noted the chilling effect
that the existence of this power can have on those who otherwise
would be willing to deal with the debtor in financial difficulty. 2 McCoid has suggested its abolition or curtailment, partially for that
238. Regardless of the speed with which the property of the estate might be liquidated,
it is impractical to attempt to pay dividends until six months after the first meeting of creditors, which is the deadline for filing of claims. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 302 (e). Published statistics suggest that cases remain open, on the average, for about one year. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 9.
239. See L. LoPucki, supra note 93 (finding that of 41 business debtors who entered
Chapter 11 with a going business, 24 were closed within two years. Only one of the 24 was
closed by the court over the objection of the debtor).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 99-121.
241. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (4) (Supp. III 1979).
242. See, e.g., McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of
Doubt, 67 VA. L. Rav. 249 (1981); MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured
Transactions,60 COLUM. L. Rav. 593 (1960).
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reason.24

The power to avoid preferential transfers is ineffective in countering the effects of bankruptcy planning. The bankruptcy planner
is aware of both the trustee's powers and the length of time over
which they can be exercised. The debtor simply makes the transfer
and then waits the prescribed period before filing the petition. If it
is likely that the debtor cannot wait the prescribed period before
filing, either because it needs other bankruptcy relief in the interim
or because creditors may file an involuntary petition, some other
method of dissipation is selected, such as excessive risk taking,
double transfers which leave the property in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser and the bankruptcy planner's booty in the hands of a
judgment proof defendant, 2" or the making of a large number of
questionable transactions, each too small to be economically
avoided by the trustee. The effectiveness of this last technique can
be augmented by liquidating and distributing the entire estate
before filing the bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee is then faced
with the substantial task of reconstruction, investigation and litigation of each of the debtor's transactions. He must begin without
financial resources or assurance that he will be paid for his efforts
since the bankruptcy estate, which is the only practical source of
funding for these activities, initially has no assets.23
For these reasons the powers of the trustee to set aside retroactively prefiling transactions entered into by the debtor are little
more effective than the state remedy counterparts in the law of
fraudulent conveyances and substantially less effective than having
the debtor under the control of the court, or the business in the
hands of a trustee, during the critical period. Yet the delays available to the debtor in the state remedies stage assure in most cases
the debtor will not be under the control of the court during the critical period.
Staging of the coercive collection process also tends to cause
unnecessary litigation. Debtors engaged in bankruptcy planning or
who desire delay for other reasons can obtain it by asserting defenses, real or imagined, in the state remedies subsystem. At the
drop of a bankruptcy petition, that litigation must stop, and the
matters must thereafter be dealt with through, if not in, the bank243. See McCoid, supra note 242.
244. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (Supp. III 1979).
245. In about 80% of all straight bankruptcy cases there are insufficient assets to pay
anything beyond the expenses of administration. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS,
supra note 3, at 8, 9. In 66 % of straight bankrupty cases, there are no assets whatsoever. See
id. at 8, 9. In those cases even the expenses of administration are not paid.
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ruptcy court. In its worst manifestations this duplication of efforts
by state courts and bankruptcy courts can be alleviated by permitting complex litigation already underway in the state courts to continue there.2 6 However, this does not eliminate the necessity for
many creditors to make their way entirely through state remedy
procedures only to find that the debtor has filed bankruptcy and
that they must now comply with the procedures and suffer the delays of the bankruptcy subsystem as well.
The two-stage coercive collection process increases the expense
to debtors as well as creditors. They incur the legal expenses of defending both the state proceedings, and the bankruptcy proceedings, and engaging in the bankruptcy planning process. In some instances the debtor will find it necessary to continue the operation of
a nonviable business to implement the bankruptcy plan. For example, a corporation which owes substantial unsecured debt to its owners will probably wish to secure that debt and thereby prefer the
owners. If the debtor simply did so and ceased operations, the other
creditors would undoubtedly bring suits, probably stumble upon
the transfer within the one year preference period allowed by bankruptcy law, and file an involuntary bankruptcy petition to have the
transfer set aside.4 7 If operations continue, on the other hand, creditors will be slower to move and perhaps even less likely to regard the
transfer as fraudulent. The result is that a law designed to prevent
preferential transfers instead has the effect of compelling the continued operation of a nonviable business.
Even without the consideration of bankruptcy planning, debtors have a natural tendency to continue operation of their business
28
well beyond the point when it ceases to have any hope of viability.
Giving free rein to the debtor to do so wastes not only the assets of
the business but often the time and productive efforts of the debtor
as well. The delays of the state remedies/bankruptcy system serve
the important function of permitting the debtor an unhurried opportunity to verify for himself that the enterprise has failed, and to
adjust psychologically to his new status before it is finally thrust
246.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (Supp. III 1979); see, e.g., In Re Terra Mar Associates, 3
Bankr. 462 (Bankr. Conn. 1980) (despite the filing of a Chapter 11 proceeding, the bankruptcy court permitted the state court to go ahead with a foreclosure sale that had been set a
year earlier and had been heavily advertised).
247. See Davidoff, Involuntary Bankruptcy, in BASIC BANKRUPTCY, ALTERNATIVES,
PROCEEDINGS AND DISCHARGES 77-79 (Abramson ed. 1971).
248. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 14 ("Debtors are reluctant to file voluntary
petitions until after the situation has become hopeless."); see also P. NELSON, supra note 12,
at 69-70, 97-99.
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upon him by the forced liquidation of the business. 249 For this reason
there is undoubtedly a pace which cannot be exceeded in the process of forcing the nonviable enterprise out, without seriously increasing the likelihood of disruptions by debtors who are not yet
ready to admit failure and go quietly. 20 It is the experience of this
author, however, that the delays available to debtors under present
procedures are so great that the opposite effect is achieved. Guiltridden debtors exhaust every reasonable possibility of success,
spend considerable time on the unreasonable ones, and often are
genuinely relieved when the bankruptcy court finally declares an
end to the impossible task. 51
All of these unfortunate effects result from the channelling of
cases against debtors in financial difficulty through the state court
subsystem before they reach the bankruptcy subsystem, rather
than channelling them directly to the latter. Yet there do not seem
to be any functions which are performed by the state remedies subsystem with regard to the business debtor in financial difficulty that
cannot be performed just as well and efficiently by the bankruptcy
subsystem alone. The state remedies subsystem affords debtors arbitrary delays in which to reorganize their financial affairs, but such
arbitrary delays could easily be built into the bankruptcy subsystem if they were useful or effective. The state remedies subsystem
supposedly brings the debtor face to face with cold reality in its
threat to liquidate the debtor's business on expiration of a deadline,
but, as has already been seen, the threat is a hollow one. The state
remedies subsystem is attractive to individual creditors because it
enables the more aggressive amongst them to obtain a higher priority in the pool of assets available to the creditors, but this advantage
comes at the expense of other creditors, and does not therefore improve the overall functioning of the system. m It would appear that
the overall functioning of the state remedies/bankruptcy system
could be improved, and made less costly, by channelling cases
against debtors in financial difficulty directly into the bankruptcy
subsystem. Part III contains a proposal for implementing such a
change.

249. See Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out, Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure,
15 PSYCHIATRY 451 (1952).
250. Id. at 457-59.
251. The author was engaged in bankruptcy practice on behalf of small firm debtors
from 1972 to 1980 in Gainesville, Florida.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 216-33.

1982:311

III. A

State Remedies/Bankruptcy System

PROPOSAL FOR A ONE STAGE COERCIVE COLLECTION PROCESS

In 1973 the National Bankruptcy Commission reported that it
had "encountered a generally prevalent opinion in the business
community that a major factor explaining the smallness of distributions in business bankruptcies is the delay in the institution of proceedings for liquidation until assets are largely depleted." The
Commission attempted to explain the problem by noting that
"debtors are reluctant to file voluntary petitions until after the situation has become hopeless," and that a number of procedural obstacles prevented creditors from initiating the proceedings.54 The
Commission recommended elimination of several procedural barriers to the filing of involuntary petitions "in order to make the Bankruptcy Act more effective as an instrumentality for relief at the instance of creditors... ."2 Although some procedural barriers were
removed with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code,m the effect on
the already abysmally low rate of involuntary filings was negligible.
Involuntary filings continued to be about one-half of one percent of
total filings. 7 With the 1978 legislation, Congress seems to have established that procedural barriers are not the explanation for the
low rate of involuntary bankruptcy filings.
The most likely explanation at this point would seem to be the
lack of a positive incentive for creditors to file. The unsecured creditor who files an involuntary petition thereby ensures that he will"
receive only a pro rata share of the debtor's estate. Historically that
has been approximately zero.m While that proportion of recovery
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 14.
Id.
255. Id. at 15.
256. Petitioning creditors are no longer required to prove that the debtor committed
an act of bankruptcy. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 303.11 (1) (15th ed. 1978). The debtor's
right to trial by jury on an involuntary petition has also been eliminated. Weintraub & Resnick, Involuntary Petitions Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 97 BANKING L.J. 292, 317
(1980); see 28 U.S.C. § 1480(b) (Supp. II11979).
257. The following table shows the rate of involuntary filings for two recent years
under the 1938 legislation, and the first full year for which statistics are available under the
1978 legislation:
Involuntary
Total
Involuntary

253.
254.

War Lnddn

Law Appnplkarb

Fillnga

Eingg

Prantag

Dec. 31, 1980
1978
1386
331,098
.00413
Sept. 30, 1979
1938
913
240,454
.00379
June 30, 1977
1938
1142
214,399
.00532
Statistics for the years ending in 1979 and 1980 were taken from Federal Judicial Workload
Statistics for those years; figures for the year ending in 1977 were taken from TABLES OF
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 3, at A-2, A-4.
258. In the 1976-77 fiscal year unsecured creditors received total distributions of
$61,109,352. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 10. In asset and nominal
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would undoubtedly increase if creditors brought debtors into the
bankruptcy subsystem before the estates were depleted, and the injury to the petitioning creditors would correspondingly decrease,
the nature of the problem would remain the same. The filing of an
involuntary bankruptcy petition to share in a pro rata distribution
to creditors is an unlikely way to collect a debt, and would appeal
only to the most pessimistic of creditors. It cannot compete with a
state remedies system that offers the diligent creditor a substantial
possibility of full recovery.
Involuntary petitions are sometimes filed as a defensive measure - to avoid a substantial preferential transfer that the debtor
has recently made to another creditor. " However, even though such
a petition is filed, and the riskm of that proceeding incurred by a few
diligent creditors, under bankruptcy law all creditors will share pro
rata in the proceeds.26 ' The petitioning creditors may be able to recover their attorneys' fees if the proceeding is successful,2 but that
again is merely an amelioration of the risk, not an incentive to file.
The risk is incurred only by those creditors who petition; if the petition is successful the benefits are shared by all. As MacLachlan put
it, writing in another context, "[E] galitarianism has run rampant
in bankruptcy." m The message to creditors is clear: if an involuntary filing is needed, it is best to let someone else do it.
Creditors should be encouraged to file involuntary bankruptcy
petitions against debtors in financial difficulty because the bankruptcy subsystem better implements the public policies underlying/
the process of resolving financial difficulties. In dealing with the
debtor in financial difficulty only the bankruptcy subsystem has
procedures reasonably well-designed to ferret out and close nonviable businesses without also destroying viable ones; to reorganize
and rehabilitate the debtor who cannot pay, without undue delay
and expense; to protect creditors against the dissipation of the assets by debtors who have nothing to lose; and to coordinate the collection efforts of creditors so that the overzealous efforts of one will
not destroy a debtor who has encountered some cash flow problems
but still might be able to pay his debts out of future income. Chanasset cases alone, allowed unsecured claims totaled more than thirty times that amount. See
id. at A-16, A-30. Figures were not available for the 80% of all cases in which there were no
assets for distribution.
259. Davidoff, supra note 247, at 77-79.
260. For a discussion of the scope of the risk, see Weintraub & Resnick, supra note
256, at 326-27.
261. MacLachlan, supra note 242, at 607.
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (3) (A) (Supp. III 1979).
263. MacLachlan, supra note 242, at 607.

1982:311

State Remedies/Bankruptcy System

nelling debtors in financial difficulty into the state remedies subsystem appears to resolve many cases, but the actual function of that
subsystem is to provide largely arbitrary delays during which some
creditors improve their positions at the expense of other creditors
and many businesses either heal themselves or collapse of their own
weight. If the debtor's problems do not resolve themselves the case
will probably make its appearance in the bankruptcy subsystem as
well, but only, to use the words of the National Bankruptcy Commission, "after the assets are largely depleted."
One way to bring cases into the bankruptcy subsystem before
depletion of the assets would be to offer successful petitioning creditors, whose debt was not a consumer debt,m a priority over general
creditors in the distribution of the bankruptcy proceedings.M For
example, if, under this proposal, creditor A sought relief in the state
remedies subsystem, and either had not yet obtained priority by
judgment or execution, or had obtained priority by levy within the
preference period of section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditor
B, by filing a successful bankruptcy petition, could obtain priority
over creditor A. Under current law creditor B, by filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, could have prevented creditor A from obtaining a priority, but could not have obtained a priority for himself.
The availability of the proposed priority would encourage creditors to determine, before taking legal action, whether the debtor's
failure to make payment was the result of financial difficulties or a
genuine dispute as to whether the debt was owing. If the debtor was
truly in financial difficulty, the creditor would find it more advantageous to file a bankruptcy proceeding than to proceed with state
remedies, because the bankruptcy subsystem would offer the creditor an immediate priority that could only be obtained after considerable delay in the state remedies subsystem.27 Proceeding against
a debtor in financial difficulty in the state remedies subsystem
would not be prohibited, but it would be discouraged by the added
risk that during the state proceeding other creditors might obtain
priority by proceeding in bankruptcy. If the debtor were not in fi264.

COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 13, at 14.

265. Only the dynamics of business cases have been discussed in this article. The dynamics of consumer cases are significantly different, and will require different treatment. See
Whitford, supra note 17. "Consumer debt" is defined in section 101 (7) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Creditors who are owed a consumer debt would be eligible to participate as petitioning
creditors in a business or nonbusiness bankruptcy, but would not be entitled to the priority
created by this proposal.
266. The priority would be available in proceedings under Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, including cases that have been converted from one chapter to another.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
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nancial difficulty the creditor would gain no advantage by a bankruptcy filing. The creditor would be unable to establish that the
debtor was "generally not paying [its] debts," the petition would
be dismissed without awarding any priority to the petitioning creditor, and the creditor would be left to its state remedies. With the
incentive of a priority in bankruptcy available to general creditors,
the state remedies/bankruptcy system would cease to be a twostage system. Creditors would find it advantageous to file cases initially in the appropriate subsystem.
It is certainly not obvious whether this rechannelling of cases
from the state remedies subsystem into the bankruptcy subsystem
would have the overall effect of increasing or decreasing judicial
caseloads or the cost of operating the state remedies/bankruptcy
system. Economies would be gained in some cases by eliminating
the tendency for bankruptcy-bound situations to first make their
appearance in, and exhaust the deadlines of, the state remedies subsystem. Economies might 'also result from combining numerous
state remedies cases against a debtor into a single bankruptcy proceeding.2 Probably the greatest potential for savings would lie in
the possibility of reducing the frequency of fraudulent transfers,
preferences and the use of bankruptcy planning devices, by reducing the time that debtors remain in unsupervised control of the insolvent, nonviable enterprise. Reduction in the number of such
transactions, in addition to reducing the loss to creditors from
them, would also reduce the need for proceedings to remedy them.
The rechannelling of cases directly into the bankruptcy subsystem would also have some tendencies to increase the costs of the
state remedies/bankruptcy system. To perform the functions of the
state remedies/bankruptcy system better the individual bankruptcy proceeding must be more complex than the state remedy
proceeding. Even though the rechannelling reduces the total
number of case filings in the state remedies/bankruptcy system, the
added complexity of the bankruptcy case over the state remedy
cases it is replacing could result in a net increase in overall expense.
Additionally, the incentive of a priority in bankruptcy may
bring cases into the bankruptcy subsystem that would not otherwise have entered either subsystem. Some creditors are familiar
with the illusory nature of the state remedy and for that, or other
268. As required by 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1) (Supp. III 1979).
269. In a survey conducted by this writer it was discovered that the 48 business entities
who filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Western District of Missouri during the first year after its effective date were defendants in a total of 163 state court collection
actions, an average of 3.4 actions per debtor. See generally L. LoPucki, supra note 93.
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reasons, presently elect instead to participate in a voluntary restructuring of the debt. With an incentive for creditors to file an
involuntary petition, some of these cases would undoubtedly make
their way into the bankruptcy subsystem.
This is not to say, however, that the proposed system would
have the tendency or the ability to attract frivolous or vindictive
filings. The legal standard governing which debtors may be involuntarily petitioned into the bankruptcy courts would remain the same.
Only those debtors who are already in receivership or those who are
generally not paying their debts as they become due could properly
be the subject of an involuntary petitionY0 The creditor would still
risk paying his own, and the debtor's attorney's fees if the creditor
could not demonstrate that this standard was met."' The petitioning creditors must still be owed at least $5000, and, except in the
rare instances where the debtor has fewer than twelve creditors,
three creditors would have to act in concert to file. 2 Under this proposal the petitioning creditors would be granted a priority greater
than that of general creditors, but less than an expense of administration. By filing, the petitioning creditors would be obtaining priority over other general creditors, but they would be subordinating
their claims to the expenses of the proceeding that they initiated.
This would be a deterrent to filing since the expenses of liquidation
which the creditors would have had to pay in the state remedies
subsystem, consisting mainly of sheriff's fees and advertising expense, generally are lower than the expenses of administration in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, the number of cases in which creditors were insufficiently motivated to enter the state remedies subsystem, but would now be sufficiently motivated to enter the bankruptcy subsystem, probably would be small. If premature triggering
of bankruptcy became a problem, the bankruptcy courts could be
given the discretion to decline to hear such cases. It is unlikely, however, that such legislation would prove necessary.
The advisability of adopting a bankruptcy priority for petitioning creditors should not depend entirely upon a comparison of expenses of operating the existing versus the proposed system. The
losses to creditors as a result of the continued operation of nonviable, insolvent businesses must also be considered. Those losses,
270.
271.
272.
273.

11 U.S.C. § 303 (h) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 303(i).
Id. § 303(b).
See generally id. § 507.
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which probably amount to billions of dollars annually,"4 are not always avoidable but they so far exceed the expenses of operating the
bankruptcy system that reduction in those losses, perhaps by as little as one percent, would save more than the entire expense of operating the bankruptcy system. In the first quarter of 1970, as the
Penn Central Railroad teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, it suffered losses of sixty-two million dollarsY75 The total annual cost of
operating the bankruptcy subsystem during that year, including the
salaries and expenses of court personnel, as well as the attorneys'
fees and other expenses of administration allowed all participants
in bankruptcy cases, probably was less .than that figureY5 It would
not be difficult to cost justify a more efficient system of handling
debtors in financial difficulty.
In considering the impact of higher business bankruptcy filing
rates under this proposal, it is important to keep in mind that the
extra services which make the bankruptcy subsystem more effective
and more expensive than the state remedies subsystem, such as
trustees, examiners, accountants, appraisers, and creditors' committees, are paid for from the bankruptcy estates, not from general
tax revenues.2" The expenses of these services are incurred on a
case-by-case basis only on approval of the bankruptcy judge after a
hearing at which their desirability can be considered and contested.28 The fees are set and paid only after another hearing at
which the contribution made by those services can be evaluatedYm
Where the participants in the proceeding do not think that the costs
are justified, the costs need not be incurred.m

274. In fiscal year 1976-77, there were almost two billion dollars of unsecured claims
allowed in the 35 % of bankruptcy cases that were classified as asset or nominal asset cases.
Statistics were not available for no asset cases; nor for the claims against debtors who failed
but did not file for bankruptcy. TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 3, at A-16, A30.
275. J. ARGENTI, supra note 119, at 110.
276. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 127-34. It should be kept in mind that
only a small portion of this expense is borne by the public through tax revenues. The bankruptcy system is largely self-supporting, which is to say that it is supported by the debtors
and creditors who use it. Id. at 127.
277. Id.
278. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 327 (Supp. III 1979). To save court costs the hearing will not be
held every time such a service is to be incurred, but the hearing is always available at the
request of a party in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. III 1979).
279. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 328-330 (Supp. III 1979).
280. The primary exception is that a trustee must always be appointed in proceedings
under Chapter 7. However, that trustee's maximum compensation is sharply limited by 11
U.S.C. § 326 (a).
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE DYNMIcS OF THE STATE

REMEDIES/BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM

Failure of the debtor to pay a debt when due creates a disequilibrium. To the extent that the creditor needs prompt payment,
fears ultimate loss of the funds loaned, or simply feels the necessity
to follow its own collection practices, energies of the creditor are
directed into the coercive collection process. Those energies provide
the force that drives the system.
Although the bankruptcy subsystem can better serve the economic interests of the debtor and its creditors in the aggregate, the
economic interests of the diligent individual creditor currently are
served best by the state remedies subsystem.a 1The diligent individual creditor is the dynamic element of the system, thus, the interests of the aggregate are ignored as individual creditors seek their
advantage in the state remedies subsystem.
The best interests of the owners of the debtor, if not the debtor
itself, also are served best, at this stage, by proceedings in the state
remedies subsystem because the state remedies subsystem constitutes no immediate threat to the debtor's ownership or the continued operation of the business. Both debtor and creditor therefore
are content to allow matters to proceed in the state remedies subsystem until liquidation of the business by that subsystem becomes
imminent.
The bankruptcy treatment of preferences creates a dilemma
for the creditor proceeding in the state remedies system. To be effective the creditor must threaten harm to the debtor, perhaps
through execution against essential assets, and must make the
threat credible. But if the creditor actually inflicts the harm, and
the debtor is thereby pushed into bankruptcy, the assets are returned to the debtor and the creditor is stripped of his priority. It
would seem that the creditor must push hard, but not too hard. The
law of preferences thus operates as a damper on creditors proceeding in the state subsystem moderating the force with which creditors pursue their remedies. The dampening will occur, to some degree, without an express threat of bankruptcy, since the implied
threat is always present and can only be eliminated by actual payment of the debt and expiration of the period in which the bankruptcy trustee could reverse the payment as a preferential transfer.
Even though creditors may be unaware of the precise methods by
which debtors respond, they are generally aware that the state rem281.

See supra text accompanying notes 205-32.
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edies/bankruptcy system is expensive and relatively ineffective.
Cases go forward, but with no great enthusiasm.
While creditors proceed with their state remedies, the debtor
may take several different directions. Business may improve sufficiently for the debtor to make payments sufficient to satisfy the
creditors. Without improvement in the debtor's cash flow, the
debtor may be able to shift funds formerly committed to other creditors or other uses, and thereby satisfy the aggressive creditor, a
process often colloquially referred to as "robbing Peter to pay
Paul." The shifting of funds seldom resolves the situation (since
Peter is likely to file suit), but it does fulfill its purpose, which is to
postpone the day of reckoning.
Two other possible directions are of particular concern. The
debtor may file a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding or bring about
an informal liquidation. The debtor will tend to prefer an informal
liquidation, since it avoids the legal and administrative expenses of
bankruptcy and allows the debtor to control both the timing of the
liquidation and the persons who will share in the proceeds. If the
debtor can liquidate informally, without time constraints, it will always be to his advantage to do so. Any improprieties, whether they
be preferential transfers indirectly made to insiders or blatant
transfer of the assets to owners, will eventually be cured by the applicable periods of limitations. In such an informal liquidation the
creditors are entirely at the mercy of the debtor. None of the functions of the state remedies/bankruptcy system will be served, despite the fact that lawsuits may have been brought and judgments
entered.
Only when creditors proceeding in the state remedies subsystem pose an immediate threat of formal liquidation, as where a levy
on essential assets is imminent or the debtor is otherwise in need of
immediate relief4 available only in the bankruptcy court, will it
necessarily be to the debtor's advantage to file a "voluntary" bankruptcy petition under current law. As the threat from the state remedies subsystem becomes imminent, the uncooperative debtor's focus changes from informal liquidation to bankruptcy planning, but
his goals likely remain the same. Whether he can accomplish them,
282.

Various aspects of bankruptcy relief may be attractive to particular debtors. For

example, the existence of a bankruptcy case may afford the debtor a more favorable forum or
venue for particular litigation. Chapter 11 proceedings can be used to structure a payment
schedule with the Internal Revenue Service, or an uncooperative mortgage-holder, either to
avoid litigation or to put the business in a saleable condition. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (9) (C),
(b) (1) (known as the "cram down" provision). Finally, the debtor whose time has not yet

run out may nevertheless be impatient to discharge debt or otherwise reorganize the business.
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or whether the public policies underlying the state remedies/bankruptcy system will be given effect instead, depends upon how rapidly the uncooperative debtor can be petitioned or pushed into the
bankruptcy subsystem.
As of this writing, the pressures which creditors are able to
bring to bear against debtors in financial difficulty are inadequate to
permit the state remedies/bankruptcy system to perform its functions in most cases. Debtors are able to continue to operate nonviable businesses until they can no longer raise the cash for day-today operation. Waste, fraud, and unfair distribution of assets are
commonplace. Creditors needlessly battle against one another and
duplicate each other's efforts. An economic subclass of hopelessly
insolvent debtors who cannot be productive because of the continuing threat of state remedies but who are unwilling to incur the
stigma of bankruptcy has been created, yet creditors are still without an effective means to coerce the repayment of debt. It has been
the experience of this author that informal liquidations in favor of
the owners of insolvent enterprises generally can be carried out with
success, if not with impunity. Of those cases which do reach the
bankruptcy court only a tiny fraction were brought by creditors. Of
the others which came to the bankruptcy court at the debtor's volition, if not on his timetable, most are well past the crucial stages of
financial decay, and have nothing left for the bankruptcy court to
administer.' These cases come because an individual debtor wishes
to obtain a discharge, or perhaps because a corporation wishes to
obtain ratification of preplanned liquidation in favor of owners so
that the title to assets will not be in doubt.'
To give effect to the public policies which underly the state
remedies/bankruptcy system it is necessary that the bankruptcy
court exercise control over the debtor during the meaningful stages
283. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5, 258.
284. Assume, for example, that a relative of the owner of the business holds a bona fide
first mortgage on difficult-to-appraise assets of an insolvent business. The owner and the relative would like to close the business, and turn the assets over to the relative who will start a
new business with new financing. Both wish to assure that creditors of the old business will
not interfere with the new, for instance, by attacking the validity of the mortgage or question-

ing the sufficiency of the consideration for the transfer. The relative could bring a mortgage
foreclosure proceeding, but that might take months and, in any event, could later be declared
to be fraudulent by a bankruptcy court acting at the instance of other creditors. See, e.g.,
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (voiding an owner's title acquired by purchase at a
state court execution sale because it was part of a "planned and fraudulent scheme" to acquire the assets). Filing bankruptcy would result in the appointment of a trustee, who would
be faced with the cold realities of whether the claims against the relative were worth bringing.
Abandonment of the claims, or compromise of them for a nominal sum, would assure against
later challenges.
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of the bankruptcy process. The absence of litigation from the courts
because disputes have been amicably settled between or among the
parties is generally to be applauded. However, the potential or actual disputes between debtors and their creditors are not absent
from the bankruptcy courts because they have been amicably settled among all concerned. They are absent because the state remedies/bankruptcy system fails to offer general creditors effective procedures for the initiation of necessary bankruptcy proceedings.
The institution of effective procedures for creditor initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings would modernize the state remedies/bankruptcy process by eliminating unnecessary formalities that have
arisen under the guise of "due process" and that add unnecessary
expense and delay in the state remedies subsystem; by reducing the
necessity for creditors to duplicate the efforts of other creditors; and
by eliminating the duplication of efforts by state courts and bankruptcy courts in the current two stage process. Important as these
procedural advances would be, they are minor in comparison with
the economic effects of legal recognition that the debtor in control
of an insolvent enterprise, as well as some of its creditors, have interests that conflict with those of the enterprise's creditors in the
aggregate and the economy as a whole. To leave those debtors and
their major creditors in unsupervised control of the failing enterprise creates and sustains a national bankruptcy policy that is
predestined to fail. Providing an effective bankruptcy remedy for
general creditors could benefit those creditors without public expense, bring the bankruptcy process into the court system which
was designed to facilitate it, and perhaps make a substantial contribution to the functioning of the national economy.

